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FINANZPLATZ DEUTSCHLAND: GERMANY ENACTS
INSIDER TRADING LEGISLATION
Ursula C. Pfeil*
INTRODUCTION
On August 1, 1994, Germany's financial markets took a leap into the
world of Anglo-Saxon financial culture' as the Second Financial Mar-
kets Promotion Act (Zweites Finanzmarktf6rderungsgesetz), legislation
restructuring German financial markets and outlawing insider trading,3
became effective.4 After years of harboring an insider corporate culture,
regulated only by a voluntary code of conduct on corporate behavior
and insider dealings,' Germany, in the face of internal and external
pressures, became the last major financial center to adopt legislation
prohibiting insider trading.6 The new insider trading prohibition in Ger-
* J.D. candidate, May 1996, Washington College of Law, American University.
1. John Eisenhammer, View from Frankfurt: Learning How To Be Held To Ac-
count; John Eisenhammer Watches German Companies Try to Cope With Sharp
Changes to Share Trading Laws, THE INDEPENDENT, Aug. 15, 1994, at 26 (describing
the change to the new restrictions as a "sudden jump into hostile Anglo-Saxon ter-
rain" and a "leap across the cultural divide").
2. Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz [Second Financial Markets Promotion
Act], 1994 Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBI. I] 1749 (F.R.G.) [hereinafter FmFG].
3. Wertpapierhandelsgesetz [Law on Securities Trading], in FmFG, supra note 2.
at 1750-60 [hereinafter WpHG].
4. See Insider Trading Law Takes Effect, FACTS ON FILE VORLD NEWS DIG.,
Aug. 25, 1994, at 607 [hereinafter FACTS ON FILE] (reporting that the Second Finan-
cial Markets Promotion Act was passed on June 17, 1994, by the Bundestag, the
lower house of the German Parliament, and by the Bundesrat, the upper house of the
German Parliament, on July 8, 1994).
5. See infra notes 16-44 and accompanying text (describing prior voluntary sys-
tem of insider trading regulation in Germany).
6. See Michael D. Mann et al., Developments in International Securities Law
Enforcement and Regulation, in INT'L SEC. MARKETS 1994, at 298-321 (PLI Corporate
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many represents the first of several steps towards establishing a fairer
and more attractive investment environment in Germany and, ultimate of
promoting the growth and stature of the German financial market place
(Finanzplatz Deutschland). To ensure utmost compliance with the insider
trading prohibition and, thus, the promotion of the Finanzplatz Deutsch-
land, the new law mandates the creation of a Federal Supervisory Office
for Securities Trading (Bundesaufsichtsamt ftir den Wertpapierhandel)
with extensive compulsory powers.7 The new law also provides for stiff
criminal penalties8 and fines." Although a comprehensive insider trading
law is an essential ingredient in combatting insider trading violations,
German authorities still face both statutory and structural hurdles in
attaining an effective enforcement structure: an insider trading law with
some bite.'"
This Comment first reviews the developments leading up to
Germany's adoption of insider trading legislation by focusing on the
reasons why German legislators decided to implement insider trading
legislation after years of opposing such change and why Germany's
system of voluntary compliance no longer sufficed. Second, it embarks
on an in-depth analysis of Germany's new insider trading legislation
from both a statutory and practical vantage point, concentrating on pros-
pects for its successful enforcement. Third, this Comment provides an
overview of potential obstacles to the successful implementation of
Germany's insider trading prohibition and the intended promotion of
German capital markets that are rooted in German corporate culture, the
federalized German system, and Germany's, heretofore, decentralized
financial market structure. Finally, this Comment concludes with several
recommendations for ensuring effective insider trading enforcement and
encouraging greater investment in the Finanzplatz Deutschland.
Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-7057, 1994) (describing insider
trading laws enacted by The Netherlands, Japan, Italy, Switzerland, Germany, The
European Union, United Kingdom, Austria, France, Hong Kong, and Finland); see
also FACTS ON FILE, supra note 4, at 607 (noting that Germany was the last major
financial center to prohibit insider trading).
7. FmFG, supra note 2, §§ 3-11 at 1750-53.
8. Id. § 38 at 1759 (criminal sanctions).
9. Id. § 39 at 1759-60 (fines).
10. Cf Andreas M61ler, Das neue Insiderrecht-Eckpfeiler funktionsfdhiger
Wertpapiermiirkte [The New Insider Trading Law-Cornerstone of a Functional Secu-
rities Market], in 2 BETRIEBSWIRTSCHAFTLICHE FORSCHUNG UND PRAXIS 99, 99
(1994) (noting that the insider trading law must be believable to raise and maintain
the needed level of investor confidence in the German securities markets).
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I. BACKGROUND ON INSIDER TRADING IN GERMANY
While securities regulators pursued insider trading violations in the
United States as early as the 1930s," trading on inside information
remained a popular and unpunishable means of securing high profits in
Germany through most of 1994." For years, German business culture
has thrived in a close-knit and familiar atmosphere among companies,
banks, analysts, and journalists. 3 So-called "fireside chats," during
which German journalists, financial analysts, and others heard inside
information prior to its public announcement, were a common phenome-
na. 4 One foreign banker based in Frankfurt noted that it became a real
"joke" to watch prices move first and then data being issued. 5
A. PRE-1994 INSIDER TRADING REGULATION
Prior to the enactment of the Second Financial Markets Promotion
Act 6 and its Law on Securities Trading, 7 insider trading was not a
crime in Germany." Even though certain German laws were theoreti-
11. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 404, 15 U.S.C. § 8a-7811 (1988 &
Supp. I 1989) (setting out regulations prohibiting insider trading). See generally
NAssAR ARsHADI & THOMAS H. EYSSELL, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE
INSIDER TRADING: THEORY AND EVIDENCE 43-57 (1993) (discussing the law of insider
trading as it developed in the United States after the passage of the Securities Ex-
change Act in 1934); C. EDWARD RETCHFR, IMATERiALS ON THE LAW OF INsIDER
TRADING 13-333, 439-524 (1991) (discussing history of insider trading regulation in
the United States).
12. See Nina Magin, Krumme IVertpapier-Geschdfte sind nun strajbar ICrooked
Securities Transactions are Now Punishable], SUEDDEuTSCHE ZEITUn G [SZ], Aug. 1,
1994 (referring to study of Kiel scientists Reinhard Schmidt and Soenke Wulf, which
concluded that insiders take advantage of corporate inside information in every fifth
incidence of trading); see also Anthony Williams, Five Probed in Alleged German
Insider Scandal, REUTER W. EuR., July 25, 1994 (describing one of Germany's larg-
est insider trading scandals, uncovered a week before Germany's new law banning
insider trading went into effect, in which a ring of traders and brokers were suspected
of pocketing nearly $63 million through a front-rnmning scheme).
13. John Eisenhammer, Germany Introduces Insider Trading Law, THE INDEPEN-
DENT, July 9, 1994, at 12.
14. John Templeman & Bill Javetski, Achtung! Insider Trading Is a Crime, Bus.
WK., Dec. 5, 1994, at 54.
15. Id.
16. FmFG, supra note 2.
17. WpHG, supra note 3, at 1750-60.
18. See HAROLD S. BLOOrmNTHAL & EBERHARD RO-m, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL
MARKETS AND SECuRmEs REGULATION § 8C.11 (Clark Boardman Callaghan ed.,
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cally applicable to insider trading, such as the Stock Corporation Act, 9
criminal laws prohibiting fraud,2" or general principles of civil tort or
contract law, 2' prosecutors and plaintiffs did not invoke these laws for
that purpose.'
1992) (analyzing introduction and history of insider trading rules in Germany); Heinz-
Dieter Assmann, Das kiinftige deutsche Insiderrecht (I) [The Future German Insider
Trading Law], DIE AKTENGESELLSCHAFr, May 1994, at 196 [hereinafter Das
Kiinftigel (providing detailed analysis of developments leading up to insider trading
legislation in Germany); Joseph Blum, The Regulation of Insider Trading in Germany:
Who's Afraid of Self-Restraint?, 7 J. INT'L L. Bus. 507, 512-30 (1986) (giving a
detailed analysis of the history of regulation of insider trading in Germany); Andreas
J. Roquette, New Developments Relating to the Internationalization of the Capital
Markets: A Comparison of Legislative Reforms in the United States, the European
Community, and Germany, 14 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 565, 599-615 (1994) (describ-
ing deregulated German securities exchanges, developments leading up to insider trad-
ing rules, and the then anticipated legislative reforms in Germany); Hans-Bernd
Schafer & Claus Ott, Economic Effects of EEC Insider Trading Regulation Applied to
Germany, 12 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 357, 357-62 (1992) (explaining development of
insider trading regulation in Germany).
19. Aktiengesetz [AktG], 1965 BGBI. I 1089, at 177 (W. Ger.), amended by
.1994 BGBI. I 48, at 1777 (F.R.G.); see, e.g., Blum, supra note 18, at 514-15 (find-
ing that Article 93 of the Stock Corporation Act theoretically could be used to im-
pose civil liability on corporate insiders, such as directors and managers, for breaching
their fiduciary duty to the corporation by releasing confidential company information
to third parties); Schafer & Ott, supra note 18, at 359 (stating that since corporations
must make "an application for prosecution" for breach of fiduciary duty under the
Stock Corporation, no insider trading prosecutions have been brought under this provi-
sion); David L. Hoeflmayr, The Developing German Insider Trading Regulation, 4
GERMAN AM. L. J. 31 (1994) (noting that, with respect to suits under the Insider
Trading Guidelines, corporations probably have little incentive to sue their own man-
agement).
20. Schafer & Ott, supra note 18, at 359 (stating that German criminal anti-fraud
laws do not apply to insider trading activities occurring on the stock market because
"a duty to disclose inside information to an outsider as a precondition of fraudulent
deception can hardly be imposed for the benefit of an anonymous market").
21. Bitrgerliches Gesetzbuch [Civil Code] [BGB], 1896 Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBI.]
195, amended by 1981 BGBI. 553 (F.R.G.); see Blum, supra note 18, at 514 (dis-
cussing the possibility of holding insiders liable for failing to disclose material, non-
public information to outsiders prior to making a trade under § 123 of the German
Civil Code, under which contracts entered into by deceit, such as buyer's failure to
disclose certain material facts to seller, are voidable).
22. See Blum, supra note 18, at 514-15 (noting, first, that German courts have
not addressed the issue of whether corporations can sue their directors and managers
under the Stock Corporation Act for alleged insider trading violations; second, that
derivative shareholder actions are not permitted under German law; and third, the high
likelihood that a civil law action by a buyer against a seller for failure to disclose
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German legislators first devised Insider Trading Guidelines (Guide-
lines)' in 1970, and later revised and amended them in 1976 and
1988.24 These Guidelines are comparable to a so-called gentleman's
agreemente or a moral code in that they were binding only on those
persons who voluntarily submitted to them by private contract. Thus,
by means of individual contracts between a corporation or bank and its
corporate insiders, such insiders could commit themselves to abstain
from insider tradinge and to submit to an investigation if suspicions of
insider trading arose." The sole remedy authorized by the regulations
was the disgorgement of trading profits to the corporation,' or in the
event of refusal, an action in court for breach of contract." The Guide-
lines provided for no criminal sanctionsO
inside information would fail since the necessary element of privity between buyer
and seller is not met in most securities actions).
23. Insiderhandels-Richtlinien [Insider Trading Rules], reprinted in R. BRUNS,
WERTPAPIER uND BOERSE 436 (1976), translated in Gerhard Wegen, Congratulations
From Your Continental Cousins, IOB-5: Securities Fraud Regulation From the Eu-
ropean Perspective, 61 FORDHAi L. REV. S57, S81-$84 (1993) [hereinafter Guide-
lines, see BLOOhMETrHAL & ROlm, supra note 18, § 8C.11 (providing a history of
insider trading guidelines); Blum, supra note 18, at 515-28 (giving a detailed descrip-
tion and critique of the Guidelines and presenting two case studies involving applica-
tion of Guidelines to the Thyssen takeover of Reinstahl and the Daimler-Benz pur-
chase of AEG); Harvey L. Pitt & David B. Hardison, Games Without Frontiers:
Trends in the International Response to Insider Trading, 55 LAw & CON€ITP.
PROBs. 199, 213-16 (1992) (providing cursory description of background, content, and
enforcement of the Guidelines); Schafer & Ott, supra note 18, at 358-60 (describing
history, scope, and enforcement of the Guidelines); Daniel J. Standen, Insider Trading
Reforms Sweep Across Germany: Bracing for the Cold Winds of Change, 36 HAR-
VARD INT'L L. J. 177, 195-201 (1995) (discussing voluntary insider trading guidelines
and problems with "German system of self-restraint"); Hoeflmayr, supra note 19, at
31 (providing short discussion of the Guidelines).
24. BLOOMENTHAL & ROHM, supra note 18, § 8C.11.
25. Id.
26. Schafer & Ott, supra note 18, at 360.
27. See Guidelines, supra note 23, § 5 at S83 (stating that the corporation shall
persuade insiders in its employment to submit themselves to the Guidelines). See also
Blum, supra note 18, at 517 (stating that insiders may contractually bind themselves
to comply with the Guidelines); Schafer & Ott, supra note 18, at 359 (declaring
Guidelines are only binding if insiders enter private contracts).
28. Schafer & Ott, supra note 18, at 359; Blum, supra note 18, at 517.
29. Schafer & Ott, supra note 18, at 359.
30. Guidelines, supra note 23, § 4(1) at S83.
31. Id. § 4(2) at S83 (providing for contract remedies).
32. Blum, supra note 18, at 524.
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Even though the majority of corporate Germany had accepted this
voluntary code of conduct by 1992,33 investigations under the Guide-
lines remained scarce3 4 and conclusive findings of insider trading were
practically nonexistent.35 While the Guidelines provided that a five-
member Board of Inquiry be established at each of the regional ex-
changes to investigate alleged insider violations,36 a Board of Inquiry
generally was not permitted to initiate an investigation absent the sub-
mission of a complaint. 7 Because this procedure effectively required
corporations to bring an action against their own management, the cor-
porations rarely submitted such complaints.3" In practical terms, the old
procedure left the enforcement of the Guidelines completely at the dis-
cretion of leading federal trade and industry associations and the bank-
33. BLOOMENTHAL & ROHM, supra note 18, § 8C.11 (noting that 70% of all
corporations quoted on the listed or unlisted markets have agreed to abide by the
Insider Rules and pointing out that these corporations represent 90% of the actual
transactions in securities in German corporations).
34. See Sweeping Out the Stables, ECONOMIST, Aug. 31, 1991, at 15 (finding that
-the Frankfurt Stock Exchange on the average conducted five to 10 insider trading
investigations annually). From 1964 to 1993, there were approximately 32 cases of
suspected insider trading in Germany involving the companies: Boswau Et. Knaur AG
(1964), DEA (1966), Sarotti AG (1967), Langenbrahm AG (1968), Maschinenfabrik
Fahr (1968), Geraer Strickgarnfabrik Gebr. Feistkom AG (1968), Julius Berger AG
(1969), Glanzstoff AG (1969), Daimler Benz AG (1969), Ilseder HOtte AG/Salzgitter
AG (1969), Nordzement AG (1969), Preussag (1969), Elikraft AG (1970), RWE
(1970), Audi-NSU AG (1971), Bayer AG (1972), Thyssen/Rheinstahl (1973), Adca AG
(1973), Kdmerei D6hren (1973), AGIV/Trition-Belco AG (1973), BuMIWestLB
(1980), Neckermann AG (1980), Bremer Vulkan (1982), AEG (1985), Klockner
(1988), Springer AG (1988), Berthold AG (1989), Daimler Benz/Mercedes Holding
(1993), Moksel (1993), Technocell (1993), Quante AG (1993), and Wansche AG
(1993). Matthias Magnus, Insidergeschifte und Reglungsbedarf aus dkonomischer Sicht
[Insider transactions and Need for Regulation from an Economic Viewpoint] , 11
ZErrsCHRiFr FUR DAS GESAMTB KREDrrWESEN 543, 544 (1994) [hereinafter Magnus].
35. See Silvia Ascarelli, Insider Trade is Now a Crime in Germany, WALL ST. J.
EUR., Aug. 1, 1994, at 9 (reporting that "[n]o one in Germany has been found guilty
of violating the rules."). But see Blum, supra note 18, at 525-28 (discussing Daimler-
Benz's takeover bid of AEG, a large electronics firm, in 1985, where AEG stock
went up by 28% just 10 days prior to the takeover and the Board of Inquiry reluc-
tantly found only the Chairman of Supervisory Board of AEG, Dr. Klaus Kuhn, liable
for a "minor" violation requiring him to disgorge his profits).
36. Blum, supra note 18, at 523; Hoeflmayr, supra note 19, at 31.
37. Blum, supra note 18, at 523.
38. See Hoeflmayr, supra note 19, at 31 (remarking about a company's lack of
incentive to sue its own management).
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ing sector?9 In the end, resources were too scare and enforcement ef-
forts too disparate to have any effect on insider trading in Germany."
Commentators have speculated that the reason why the Guidelines were
so widely accepted by the financial community despite their ineffective-
ness in combatting insider trading is that they were merely "part of a
strategy to avoid more effective and restrictive statutory law."'
Due to the ineffectiveness of the insider trading regulations, insider
trading in Germany continued to flourish.' The investing community in
Germany and the world-at-large were aware of the widespread insider
trading practice in Germany and acted accordingly: investors generally
played the German equity market if they were insiders and invested
elsewhere if they were not."3 As confidence in the German equity mar-
ket began to erode, however, the favorable times for insiders in Germa-
ny began to change."
39. BLOOMENTHAL & Ro-M, supra note 18, § 8C.11.
40. See Ascarelli, supra note 35, at 9 (noting that while all traders at the stock
exchanges submitted to the insider-trading Guidelines, insider trading continued in
Germany because too few regulators with too few resources were in place to regulate
trading activities on Germany's eight regional exchanges).
41. Schafer & Ott, supra note 18, at 3; see Magnus, supra note 34, at 543-45
(summarizing traditional economic arguments raised by advocates of the prior system
of voluntary insider compliance; explaining that insider trading actually benefits finan-
cial markets and market participants; and criticizing assumptions on which those argu-
ments are based).
42. See Magnus, supra note 34, at 544 (providing a table illustrating alleged
insider trading scandals in Germany from 1964 through 1993 and listing the corre-
sponding newspaper source for each case). From 1980 through 1993, for example,
German newspapers covered suspected cases of insider trading involving the compa-
nies BuMIWestLB, Neckermann AG, Bremer Vulkan, AEG, Klckner, Springer AG,
Berthold AG, Daimler BenzlMercedes Holding, Moksel, Technocell, Quante AG, and
Wilnsche AG. Id; see also Ascarelli, supra note 35, at 9 (noting that insider-trading
Guidelines did little to prevent insider trading scandals from occurring at regular
intervals); infra note 53 (describing several well-known recent insider trading scandals
in Germany).
43. See Aline Sullivan, Need for Foreign Capital Prods European Reforms, INT'L
HERALrD fm., Oct. 1, 1994 (quoting a fund manager at a major United States firm
in London that investors refuse to tolerate not being on the inside track by not buy-
ing shares on the German exchange if they suspect insider trading).
44. See infra notes 49-58 and accompanying text (describing how decreased in-
vestor confidence in German securities markets attributed to enactment of legislation
criminalizing insider trading).
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B. REASONS FOR CHANGING PAST PRACTICE
The enactment of the Second Financial Markets Promotion Act' falls
in line with a number of recent trends in Germany heralding a new era
for Germany's capital markets.' Several influences have contributed to
the recent legislative drive to improve the Finanzplatz Deutschland,47
including increased pressures to compete internationally, harmonize Eu-
ropean capital markets, assist international enforcement efforts, and adapt
to technological developments. 4
45. FmFG, supra note 2.
46. See The Deutschmark Capital Markets-"Equity? Was 1st Das?,"
EUROMONEY, July 19, 1994, at 82 [hereinafter Equity] (listing the following trends to
support the notion that the German financial market is changing: (i) German compa-
nies are more frequently shifting production to other countries (e.g., Daimler-Benz
recently built a new manufacturing plant in the United States); (ii) German banks are
encountering increased pressure "to reduce their large holdings in the shares of lead-
ing industrial companies;" and (iii) the government is privatizing huge public concerns
such as Lufthansa and Deutsche Telekom).
47. See, e.g., Dieter Gamerdinger, Finanzplatz Deutschland, 15 ZErrscHRIFr FUR
.DAS GESAMTE KREDrrWESEN 717-18 (1994) (discussing general impetus behind recent
initiative to improve the "Finanzplatz Deutschland", and expressing concern that legis-
lators strike proper balance between state regulation and market forces according to
the motto of "So viel Markt wie m6glich, so viel Aufsicht wie n6tig" ["As much
market as possible, as much regulation as necessary"]); M611er, supra note 10, at 99-
101 (noting that the concept of the "Finanzplatz Deutschland", which the Federal
Ministry of Finance devised in 1992, is based on the following central premises:
(i) establishment of an efficient securities and exchange supervision comparable to
international standards, especially in the area of insider trading surveillance; (ii) im-
provement of investor access to information and market transparency; (iii) creation of
a code of conduct for market participants to ensure greater investor protection;
(iv) establishment of similar competitive conditions for floor and on-line trading; and
(v) promotion of market liquidity and attractiveness of securities; Ulrich Stache, Der
Finanzplatz Deutschland wird attraktiver [The Financial Marketplace of Germany
Becomes More Attractive], BANK MAGAZIN, Feb. 1994, at 50-54 (describing German
federal government's goal of improving the "Finanzplatz Deutschland" through the
Financial Market Promotion Act (Finanzmarkfldrderungsgesetz)).
48. See EBERHARD SCHWARK, B6RSENGESETZ: KOMMENTAR zuM B6RSENGESE1Z
UND ZU DEN B6RSENRECHTLICHEN NEBENBESTIMMUNGEN [STOCK EXCHANGE LAW:
COMMENTARY TO THE STOCK EXCHANGE LAW AND TO RELATED INCIDENTAL PROVI-
SIONS] 54-57 (1994) (noting that harmonization of European capital markets, increased
self-financing of corporations through capital markets, and sharper international compe-
tition has caused innovation of German stock market); see also Pitt & Hardison,
supra note 23, at 2-4 (discussing competitive pressures, international enforcement
efforts, and technological development as primary factors that encourage most coun-
tries to prohibit insider trading).
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1. International Competition
German legislators adopted insider trading legislation primarily as a
means of strengthening Frankfurt's position as a leading financial market
center of continental Europe in a time of growing international competi-
tion.49 Germany realized that it would be unable to set the European
standard for financial markets' and make inroads in its continuing
competition with Europe's financial powerhouse London"' unless Ger-
many enacted insider trading laws." Numerous highly-publicized insider
trading scandals in recent German history contributed to an erosion of
domestic and foreign investor confidence in Germany's security mar-
kets 3 and, in turn, resulted in increased political pressure to level the
49. The Federal Ministry of Finance, Bonn, F.R.G., Towards a German Financial
Center (Jan. 1992), translated in Gerhard Wegen, Transnational Financial Servic-
es-Current Challenges for an Integrated Europe, 60 FORD-AM L. REv. S91, S110
(1992) [hereinafter Towards a German Financial Center] (discussing German
government's goal of actively developing an internationally competitive financial center
in Germany by implementing widespread market reform including an insider trading
law); see Deutsche Birse AG and Ministry Welcome Passage of Markets Act, WALL
ST. J. EUROPE, July 11, 1994 (quoting Germany's Finance Minister Theo Waigel as
heralding the law's passage as a "sustained strengthening of the position of Germany
as a financial markets center against international competitors"); see also Andrew
Fisher, Frankfurt Brushes Up its Act: Germany's Financial Capital Is Improving its
Appeal as a Regional Center, FIN. TMES, Dec. 9, 1994, at 16 [hereinafter Frnkfurt
Brushes Up] (finding that of the S68 billion invested in foreign equities by United
States investors last year, only S2.7 billion went to Germany).
50. Germany's desire to set the European standard for financial markets is im-
plicitly required by its status as the future home for the European Monetary Institute,
a precursor of the planned European Central Bank EWI. Cf. Andrew Fisher, Survey of
Germany, FiN. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1994, at V [hereinafter Survey of Germany] (noting
that Frankfurt, home of the Bundesbank and the new European Monetary Institute, has
a central place in the restructuring of Germany's financial markets).
51. Cf. Karen Heemann et al., Geld und Gr'flenwahn iMoney and Pursuit for
Greatness], Focus MAG., Mar. 6, 1995, at 272-74 (noting that German bankers wit-
nessed the Barings crash with "one laughing and one crying eye" because of
Frankfurt's continuing battle against the previously overpowering and often arrogant
city of London, on one side, and the incentive the obvious failure of English supervi-
sory practices will give German banking hardliners for greater regulatory control in
Germany).
52. Baie Netzer, New Legislation Fuels Up German Regulatory Arsenal, INT'L
HERALD TM., Oct. 1, 1994; see Rupert Bruce, U.S., Britain Spur Asia Toward Re-
form, INT'L HERALD TB., Oct. 1, 1994 (referring to Barry Rider's, Dean of Jesus
College at Cambridge University and an authority on insider trading, opinion that the
presence of insider trading laws make a securities market respectable).
53. See, e.g., Germany Laments Loss of the Prussian Virtues, Ti?.Ms, Aug. 16,
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inherently unfair playing field in German securities.54 Accordingly, the
German financial world came to view the enactment of insider trading
legislation as a key strategy for fostering the competitiveness of German
capital markets and rectifying Frankfurt's historically weak image in the
eyes of the international financial community." The new insider deal-
ing law is expected to attract new domestic and foreign investors 6 and
thereby raise much needed equity capital, an essential ingredient for in-
1994 (noting that Germany "suffered an unprecedented outbreak of fraudulent bank-
ruptcies and corporate criminality during the past couple of years" with a 30% in-
crease in white collar crimes last year alone); Ascarelli, supra note 35, at 9 (describ-
ing first how German attitude towards insider trading became more skeptical after
"charges of widespread abuses led the Frankfurt prosecutor's office in 1991 to investi-
gate at least 270 people for allegedly evading taxes on income related to insider
trading" and, second, attributing growing public outrage over inside trading to the af-
fair of Franz Steinkuhler, former head of the powerful IG Metall metalworkers union
and a member of Daimler-Benz AG's supervisory board, who reaped considerable
profits by investing nearly one million marks in Daimler shares shortly before
Dalmler announced market-moving information); Williams, supra note 12 (describing
Germany's biggest stock exchange scandal, exposed only a week before Germany's
-insider trading law went into effect, in which a ring of over twenty traders and bro-
kers were suspected of making over 100 million marks in profits in a scheme called
"front-running" in which dealers buy stock in a company they know is about to be
traded heavily); David Gow, Insider Dealing "Mafia" Danger, GUARDIAN, July 26,
1994, at 15 (reporting that financial authorities tried to dispel rumours of a "stock-ex-
change mafia" to prevent damage to Frankfurt's international standing); John Willcock,
Barclays Offshoot in German Tax Evasion Inquiry, THE INDEPENDENT, July 26, 1994,
at 23 (announcing what may be Germany's most serious stock exchange trading scan-
dal).
54. See Ascarelli, supra note 35, at 9 (stating that numerous recent insider-trading
scandals "raised doubts about the old system of self regulation").
55. Frankfurt Brushes Up, supra note 49, at 16 (commenting that Frankfurt's
appeal as a financial center is improving considerably from its prior uninspired image
as a place in which to live or do business, whereby "[s]everal years ago, foreign
bankers posted there often saw it as something less than an enhancement of their
career prospects"); cf. Andrew Fisher, Tally-Ho Sounds for Elusive German
Breed-Insider Dealers Are Hard to Track Down-But the Hunt Is On, FIN. TIMES,
Dec. 23, 1994, at 24 [hereinafter Tally-Ho] (noting that even though foreign investors
favored the London over the Frankfurt financial market, even for their Deutsch Mark
transactions in domestic securities, greater investor confidence in an improved regu-
latory system in Germany will strengthen Frankfurt's competitiveness).
56. See Netzer, INT'L HERALD TRIB., supra note 52 (noting that new law will
improve fairness of German markets and hopefully attract both international and Ger-
man investors, while also quoting Rolf Passow, Chief Executive at the mutual fund
subsidiary of the Dresdner Bank, as stating that the new law is too restrictive to
attract many additional investors).
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dustrial growth and effective international competition,' for a market in
which an equity culture has long been lacking.'
2. Harmonization of European Capital Markets
The second reason, if not the primary driving force, why legislators
decided to proscribe insider trading in Germany was to ensure harmoni-
zation of European capital markets.59 On November 13, 1989, the
Council of European Communities issued a European Community Direc-
57. See, e.g., Towards a German Financial Center, supra note 49, at 108 (noting
that the German industry and state have increased capital requirements in order to
manage structural change; and that this need for equity capital is a reason for
strengthening Germany as a financial center); Magnus, supra note 34, at 545 (finding
that investors' failure to participate in German equity markets will jeopardize corpo-
rate financing and thereby harm total economic growth); Glenn Whitney, Leveling
Charges: Top 3 German Banks Draw Fire for Choking Capital Market Growth, VALL
ST. J. EURoPE, May 11, 1994, at 1 (noting that German companies may incur higher
debt financing and stock issuance costs than their foreign counterparts because of
Germany's noncompetitive equity market, which, as a result, may hurt Germany's
industrial base and hinder development of the "Finanzplatz Deutschland").
58. See, e.g., Blum, supra note 18, at 507-11 (providing thorough analysis of
reasons for weak development of German equity markets); Magnus, supra note 34, at
545 (providing the following statistics: (i) Germany has four times fewer publicly-
financed corporations than Japan or Great Britain and 10 times fewer than the United
States, and (ii) from 1970 through 1989, stock issuance provided only up to 1.61 of
financing for West-German corporations); Guidelines, supra note 23, at S60-61 (noting
that the majority of German companies are closely held-500,000 Limited Liability
Companies, 30,000 General Partnerships, and 130,000 Limited Partnerships-and of the
2500 stock corporations, only 665 are listed on German stock exchanges); Equity,
supra note 46, at 82 (analyzing why Germany lacks an equity culture and quoting a
principal at Morgan Stanley who argues that Germany now needs equity to ensure
growth).
59. See, e.g., Towards a German Financial Center, supra note 49, at S107 (stat-
ing that "intra-EC integration' is a condition for an evolving German financial
marketing); SCHwARK, supra note 48, at 54-57 (referring to harmonization of Europe-
an capital markets as reason for new German law); Das Kilnftige, supra note 18, at
196-200 (stating that EC measures for the creation of a common market, which cul-
minated in the EC Directive on insider trading, stand in the spotlight of many other
factors contributing towards the implementation of insider trading legislation in Germa-
ny); Charles V. Baltic, I, The Next Step in Insider Trading Regulation: International
Cooperative Efforts in the Global Securities Market, 23 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
167, 192-96 (1991/1992) (noting that European Economic Community Directive on In-
sider Trading was -a means of harmonizing regulatory regimes of member states and
served more as a statement of EEC policy on investor protection rather than a mea-
sure for integrating such capital markets).
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tive (EC Directive)' requiring Member States to incorporate regulations
on insider trading into their national legislations by June 1, 1992." In
short, the EC Directive provided a minimum standard for defining "in-
side information"" and an "insider"63 to which Member States must
adhere,' but left imposition of the method of enforcement' and the
extent of penalties' largely to the discretion of the Member States.67
60. Council Directive Coordinating Regulations on Insider Dealing 89/592, 1989
OJ. (L 334) 30 [hereinafter EC Directive]. See generally HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL
& SAMUEL WOLFF, INT'L CAPITAL MARKETS AND SEC. REG. § 9A.05 (1992) (provid-
ing general overview of EC Directive); Baltic, supra note 59, at 192-96 (discussing
uniform and discretionary aspects of EC Directive); Dariusz M. Budzen & Ania M.
Frankowska, Prohibitions Against Insider Trading in the United States and the Euro-
pean Community: Providing Guidance for Legislatures of Eastern Europe, 12 B.U.
INT'L LJ. 91, 115-22 (1994) (providing general overview of EC Directive); Thomas
L. Hazen, Defining Illegal Insider Trading-Lessons From the European Community
Directive on Insider Trading, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 231, 236 (1992) (describ-
ing EC Directive as a praiseworthy attempt to balance the need for a clear and
straightforward rule against the fear of creating gaps in its coverage); Schafer & Ott,
supra note 18, at 357 (presenting an economic analysis of the EC Directive as it
concerns Germany).
61. EC Directive, supra note 60, art. 14.
62. Id. art. I (defining "inside information" as any information "which has not
been made public . . . which, if it were made public, would be likely to have a
significant effect on the price of the . . . security .... ").
63. Id. art. 2 (defining a primary insider as "any person who possesses
inside information [and takes] advantage of that information with full knowledge of
the facts by acquiring or disposing of for his own account or for the account of a
third party, either directly or indirectly .... "); id. (noting that Member States have
the option of exempting transactions effected without the assistance of a professional
intermediary in a non-recognized market); id. art. 4 (defining a secondary insider as
"any person other than [a primary insider] who with full knowledge of the facts
possess inside information. ... ).
64. Id. art. 6 (noting that Member States may adopt measures more stringent than
those required by Articles 2 and 4 of the directive).
65. Id. art. 8 (requiring only that Member States designate administrative au-
thorities with competence "to ensure that the provisions . . . [of] this Directive are
applied" and that such authorities be "given all supervisory and investigatory powers
that are necessary for the exercise of their functions .... ").
66. Id. art. 13 (failing to specify whether criminal, administrative, or civil mea-
sures shall be adopted and requiring only that penalties "shall be sufficient to promote
compliance with those measures").
67. See Amy E. Stutz, Note, A New Look at the European Community Directive
on Insider Trading, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 135, 169-72 (1990) (criticizing EC
Directive for failing to harmonize implementation of penalty and enforcement provi-
sions by Member States).
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After Germany failed to succumb to the EC Directive by the original
date of compliance, the European Commission instituted infringement
proceedings against Germany in October 1992.' Two years later, on
July 8, 1994, Germany finally passed the required insider trading law,
thereby becoming the last European Community Member State to pro-
hibit insider trading.' While absolute reliance on the EC Directive as
the basis of the changed laws .in Germany, particularly considering the
two year delay in compliance, is misplaced," the EC Directive clearly
forced German legislators to re-conceptualize their view of the insider
trading phenomena in Germany.7! ' Supporters of the old system of non-
supervision came to realize that insider trading is not a victimless
crime,' for, at a minimum, insider trading in Germany did harm the
Finanzplatz Deutschland.'
68. European Parliament Question on the Insider Dealing Directive 8915921EEC,
1994 OJ. (C 226) 35.
69. Heinz-Dieter Assmann, Kein Papiertiger. aber Auslegungsprobleme [No
Papertiger, but Interpretation Problems), SZ, Aug. 5, 1994 [hereinafter Kein
Papiertiger].
70. See Hoeflmayr, supra note 19, at 31 (stating that the German bill was formu-
lated under the EC Directive). While the EC Directive clearly was not the only factor
contributing to implementation of insider trading legislation in Germany, its impor-
tance should not necessarily be diminished solely on the basis of Germany's delayed
compliance with its measures. After all, the insider regulation was only a part, albeit
a central part, of much broader measures to modernize Germany's financial market-
place. Das Kiinftige, supra note 18, at 199. The Federal Minister of Finance released
the first draft of the proposal to make over Germany's capital markets in August,
1992, and it inevitably took some time to finalize this proposal in the form of the
Second Financial Markets Promotion Act. ld In fact, the fourth draft of the Act was
the first to reach the Federal Cabinet. Id. at 200.
71. Das Kiinftige, supra note 18 (noting that the EC Directive first compelled
German legislators to change their way of thinking about their current system of self-
regulation, which had been in place for the past 30 years, and speculating that Ger-
many may not have complied with the EC Directive had the reputation of the
Finanzplatz Deutschland not been at issue).
72. See Magnus, supra note 34, at 543-45 (concluding that the potential costs of
insider trading for the efficient functioning of Germany's capital market far outweigh
any potential usefulness of such trading activity; and that past insider trading activity
in Germany may have jeopardized the equity financing of investments and, thereby,
impaired Germany's economic growth); cf. Dealing with Insider Trading, ECONOMIST,
July 16, 1994 [hereinafter Dealing] (discussing argument that insider trading generally
is a victimless crime that makes the stockmarket run more efficiently and often leads
to more winners than losers).
73. See Sullivan, supra note 43 (noting how foreign investors refused to invest in
Germany's capital markets due to widespread insider trading in Germany).
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3. International Enforcement Efforts
The third reason the German legislature passed insider trading legisla-
tion was the growing need to provide mutual assistance in the interna-
tional enforcement of insider trading violations.74 The globalization of
securities markets has expedited investment in international securities
markets and, consequently, has created better opportunities for insider
traders to escape prosecution75 and shield their illicit profits from detec-
tion.76 In the past, Germany has been unable to assist enforcement au-
thorities in the United States or elsewhere in the investigation and prose-
cution of insider trading violations because German bank secrecy prohib-
its the release of banking account information except for criminal pro-
ceedings under German law.' As a result, the continued application of
insider trading laws to securities transactions based in Germany by for-
74. Dealing, supra note 72 (stating that the criminalization of insider trading is
necessary to ensure "international collaboration, subject to the principle of reciprocity
and due respect for bank confidentiality").
75. See Michael D. Mann & Lise A. Lustgarten, Internationalization of Insider
Trading Enforcement----A Guide to Regulation and Cooperation, in INT'L SEC. MAR-
iErs 1993, at 2 (PLI Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-
7024, 1993) (noting that United States insiders often take advantage of global secu-
rities markets since foreign bank secrecy and difficulty in obtaining foreign-based evi-
dence shield them from detection by United States enforcement authorities); see also
Pitt & Hardison, supra note 23, at 203-04 (noting that unprincipled traders often pre-
vent disclosure of account information to foreign authorities by trading in jurisdictions
with secrecy and blocking laws).
76. Global Recognition of Legal Judgments Next Big Enforcement Issue, Mann
Advises, 21 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 44, at 1665 (Nov. 10, 1989) (interview
of Michael Mann, Director, Office of International Affairs, SEC) (noting that coop-
eration is necessary to ensure detection and seizure of fruits of illegal insider trading
activities that have been deposited in foreign accounts).
77. See Otto Sandrock & Ellen Klausing, Germany, in EUROPEAN BANKING LAW:
THE BANKER-CUSTOMER RELATIoNsHIP 61, 92 (Ross Cranston ed., 1993) (explaining
that bank secrecy in Germany is derived from the contractual relationship between the
financial institution and customer and the general fiduciary duty arising therefrom).
Furthermore, the German Federal Constitution establishes the basic premises underlying
German bank secrecy. GRUNDGESETZ [Federal Constitution] [GG] art. 1 (containing
citizen's fundamental right to decide about diffusion of personal data); id. art. 2(1)
(containing citizen's fundamental right to personal integrity and privacy); id. art. 12(1)
(containing fundamental right of freedom in exercise of professional duties). See gen-
erally Sandrock & Klausing, supra, at 92-108 (discussing the legal basis and confines
of exceptions to bank secrecy in Germany); Peter Q. Noack, Comment, West German
Bank Secrecy: A Barrier to SEC Insider-Trading Investigations, 20 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 609, 619-23 (1987) (describing German bank secrecy).
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eign authorities, particularly the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), has directed greater attention to Germany's inability
to cooperate in these enforcement efforts and, in turn, served as an
additional incentive for Germany to enact insider trading legislation.'8
4. Technological Developments
Technological developments represent a fourth factor influencing Ger-
man authorities to adopt insider trading legislation.'8 As technological
advances in Germany facilitate the sale and purchase of securities, such
as its electronic trading system (IBIS),' opportunities for insider trad-
78. See SEC v. Marcour, No. CIV.A.90-1390, 1990 SEC LEXIS 1213 (D.D.C.
June 14, 1990) (alleging that Marcour, employee of Apollo Computer Inc.'s German
subsidiary, violated United States securities laws by trading on inside information
concerning decline in Apollo's sales and revenues obtained through his position as
international sales manager); see also Pitt & Hardison, supra note 23, at 204 (refer-
ring to pressure the SEC has placed on foreign countries to enact legislation proscrib-
ing insider trading and assist the SEC in insider cases). Barry Rider, Dean of Jesus
College of Cambridge University and an authority on insider trading, has also ex-
pressed the opinion that the SEC strongly influenced Germany, Switzerland, and Japan
to implement insider trading legislation. Bruce, supra note 52. Nevertheless, Michael
Mann, Director of the Office of International Affairs, U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, characterizes the SEC's approach in promoting foreign insider trading
laws as "mutual respect for law" not "lex americana." Id.
79. See Towards a German Financial Center, supra note 49, at S109-10 (noting
that linking of market economy and technology is necessary for ensuring competitive-
ness of Germany as a financial center); Pitt & Hardison, supra note 23, at 206-07
(discussing technological developments as a principal factor motivating most countries
to prohibit insider trading).
80. See Equity, supra note 46, at 82 (describing that in December 1989, Frank-
furt launched a nationwide computerized trading system, the "Integrierten
Boersenhandels- und Informations Systems" (IBIS), which now accounts for 40% of
trading volume in the 30 stocks listed on the Deutscher Akdienindex (DAX)). Many
traders on the Frankfurt Exchange predict that IBIS soon will dominate trading of
German shares. Id. In late 1995, Frankfurt was eager to pursue implementation of a
successor to IBIS, the "Elektronisches Handelssystem" (EHS), a computerized auction
exchange, but then delayed further development of EHS due to opposition from
Germany's regional exchanges and broker-dealers. World Equity Markets-Germany,
EUROMONEY SUPPLEMENTS, June 29, 1994, at 11 [hereinafter World Equity Markets]
(noting opposition of regional exchanges to EHS system); Weichen f.lr die
Computerb5rsen gestellt. Aufsichtsrat der Deutsche Bdrse AG segnet neue Strategie
unter dem Stichwort Zeus ab [Advances for the Computer Exchanges are Made. The
Board of Directors for Deutsche Bdrse AG promotes a New Strategy Under the
Pseudonym Zeus, SZ, May 26, 1995 [hereinafter Computerbirsen] (noting opposition
of German broker-dealers to EHS); see also infra note 269 and accompanying text
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ing invariably grow as well.8 As previously discussed, increased inci-
dence of insider trading in Germany erodes investor confidence in Ger-
man equity markets and, as a result, jeopardizes Germany's position as a
financial center." Thus, Germany's ability to compete internationally is
inextricably interwoven with its ability to improve the transparency and
liquidity of its stockmarkets and the accuracy and fairness of stock
transactions while maintaining competitive transaction costs.83 Germany
can only attain these goals and ensure its international competitiveness
if, according to the German Ministry of Finance, its financial markets
have access to "modem microelectronics and communications technology
to develop the stock exchange system and optimize its organizational
structure.
8 4
II. GERMANY'S NEW LAW ON INSIDER TRADING
After twenty-five years of harboring an ineffective system of volun-
tary insider trading compliance, Germany finally enacted its first law
criminalizing insider trading in August 1994." This section focuses,
(discussing the Deutsche B6rse AG's newest proposal (ZEUS) to implement gradually
a complete electronic trading system in Germany in the place of floor trading within
the next three to five years).
81. See Pitt & Hardison, supra note 23, at 206-07 (stating that rapid technologi-
cal advances facilitating telecommunications, multiple listing of securities, and 24 hour
trading increase opportunities for insider trading, while also creating new opportunities
for more effective surveillance); see also Politische Skepsis, supra note 269, at 31
(citing the Bavarian President of the Landeszentralbank, Franz-Christoph Zeitler, as
stating that actual people could better evaluate the risks of the trading activity on the
exchanges than computer programs).
82. See supra notes 12-44 and accompanying text (describing the past insider
trading climate in Germany and the detrimental effects this widespread practice had
on investment in German capital markets).
83. See Towards a German Financial Center, supra note 49, at SI10 (noting
Finance Ministry's belief that a "prime objective" in improving the Finanzplatz
Deutschland and ensuring its international competitiveness is maintaining competitive
costs for securities transactions while simultaneously enhancing the safety of transac-
tions and the market's transparency and liquidity).
84. Towards a German Financial Center, supra note 49, at SI10.
85. See supra notes 16-44 and accompanying text (discussing previous system of
voluntary insider regulation in Germany).
86. WpHG, supra note 3, at 1750-60; see SCHWARK, supra note 48, at 1, 47-54
(analyzing Germany's Insider Trading Law); Das Kinftige, supra note 18, at 196,
196-206 (discussing Germany's new insider trading prohibition); Herbert Jiltten, Das
Zweite Finanzmarkoffrderungsgesetz aus Sicht der Kreditwirtschaft [The Second Finan-
cial Markets Promotion Act from the Viewpoint of the Financial Institutions], DIE
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first, on the basic structure of the new law and its central provisions;
second, on the scope of the law's insider trading prohibition; third, on
the three-tiered level of market supervision proposed and the respective
investigatory and remedial powers accorded to each tier, and, lastly, on
potential barriers to the successful enforcement of the new law.
A. BASIC STRUCTURE AND CENTRAL PROVISIONS
The German Parliament passed its new Law on Securities Trading (In-
sider Trading Law),' together with several other amended laws, as part
of the Second Financial Markets Promotion Act," a so-called
"Artikelgesetz."'  Overall, the Second Financial Markets Promotion Act
contains seventeen amended laws designed to restructure German
BANK, Oct. 1993, at 601, 601-03 (analyzing Germany's Insider Trading Law from
perspective of the German banking industry); M6iler, supra note 10, at 99, 101-11
(analyzing Germany's Insider Trading Law and its role in restructuring Germany's
financial markets); Stefan Riepe, Das Zweite Finanzmarlkfrderungsgesetz-Verbesse-
rung der internationalen Wettbewerbf-ahigkeit des Finanplatzes Deutschland IThe Sec-
ond Financial Markets Promotion Act-4mprovement of the International Competitive-
ness of the Financial Marketplace of Germany], 34 DEuTscHEs STEUERcrr 1236,
1236-39 (1994) (analyzing Germany's Financial Markets Promotion Act); Wolfgang
Scharrenberg, Neue Aufsichtsstrukturen fir das Wlertpapiergeschdft [New Supervisory
Structures for the Securities Business], SPARKAsSE, Feb. 1994, at 90, 90-93 (analyzing
Germany's Insider Trading Law and pointing out problem areas); Stache, supra note
47, at 50 (summarizing main elements of Germany's Insider Trading Law); Standen,
supra note 23, at 201-05 (analyzing Germany's Second Financial Markets Promotion
Act with an emphasis on the Insider Trading Law).
87. WpHG, supra note 3, at 1750-60.
88. FmFG, supra note 2, at 1749-85.
89. An "Artikelgesetz" (articles of law or article-law) enacts and amends several
laws on a related subject matter. See id. (containing a total of 17 amended laws
dealing with the restructuring of the German financial marketplace).
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financial markets,' of which the new Insider Trading Law9 is the
centerpiece.
The Insider Trading Lawn itself consists of seven sections
(Abschnitte). The first section contains a statement on the scope of the
legislation93 and definitions of key terms. 4 The second section man-
dates the establishment of a Federal Supervisory Authority for Securities
Trading95  and defines its organization,' duties,' and compulsory
powers.98 The third section sets forth the scope of insider trading sur-
veillance by, among other things, defining primary and secondary insid-
ers, 99 prohibiting insider trading,"°  and requiring the disclosure of
market-moving information (ad hoc publicity).' The fourth section
lowers the requirement for disclosure of acquisition or sale of share
holdings from twenty-five to five percent."°  The fifth section
establishes a code of conduct for securities service firms (i.e., investment
or brokerage firms) by prohibiting such practices as front-running.'"
90. For example, the Act contains (1) the amended Stock Exchange Act
(B6rsengesetz) (Article 2), (2) the amended Investment Company Act (Gesetz fiber
Kapitalanlagegesellschaften) (Article 3), (3) the amended Foreign Investment Act
(Auslandinvestmentgesetz) (Article 4), (4) the amended Stock Corporation Act
(Aktiengesetz) (Article 5); and (5) the amended Associate Company Act (Gesetz fiber
Untemehmensbeteiligungsgesellschaften) (Article 9). See Jatten, supra note 86, at 601-
07 (providing an overview of the central features of the amendments to the Stock
Exchange Act, the Investment Company Act, and the Stock Corporation Act, among
others); see also Riepe, supra note 86, at 1236, 1239-40 (analyzing the amended
Investment Company Act and the amended Stock Corporation Act).
91. WpHG, supra note 3, at 1750-60.
92. Id. at 1750-60.
93. Id. § 1, at 1750 (describing scope of application).
94. Id. § 2 at 1750 (providing definitions).
95. Id. § 3 at 1750 (establishing the Federal Supervisory Office).
96. Id. §§ 3 and 5 at 1750 (setting forth organization of the Federal Supervisory
Office).
97. Id. §§ 4-7, 9, and 15-16 at 1750-54 (containing duties and powers of Federal
Supervisory Office, such as investigation of insider trading violations, cooperation with
state authorities, cooperation with international authorities, surveillance of disclosure
duty, surveillance of ad-hoc publicity requirement, and continuous surveillance).
98. Id. § 10 and 16 at 1752, 1754 (containing compulsory powers to enforce reg-
ulations and request information, documents, or search of business premises).
99. Id. § 13 at 1753 (defining primary insiders).
100. Id. § 14 at 1753 (containing insider trading prohibition).
101. Id. § 15 at 1753-54 (providing for ad hoc disclosure).
102. Id. § 21 at 1755 (containing corporate shareholder disclosure duties).
103. Id. § 32 at 1758 (setting forth rules of conduct for investment firms and bro-
ker-dealers); see Magin, supra note 12 (discussing frequent practice of frontrunning,
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The sixth section prescribes appropriate criminal penalties"0' and
fines."c The seventh section contains transitional provisions which pri-
marily concern disclosure requirements under section four."
B. INSIDER TRADING PROHIBITION
Section three of the Insider Trading Law"re implements the mandato-
ry requirements of the EC Directive in prohibiting insiders from trading
insider securities on insider information.' This insider trading prohibi-
tion consists of four key concepts: (1) insider," (2) insider informa-
tion, ° (3) insider securities,"' and (4) insider transactions."' It is
important to analyze these elements individually to better understand the
scope of Germany's insider trading prohibition. Further study of the
whereby German broker-dealers or investment advisors would purchase securities for
their own accounts prior to executing larger purchase orders for the same securities
on behalf of their clients, which would drive the price of the securities up and allow
the brokers to make large profits upon resale of their securities).
104. WpHG, supra note 3, § 38 at 1759 (providing for criminal sanctions).
105. Id. § 39 at 1759-60 (providing for fines).
106. Id. § 41 at 1760 (providing transitional provisions).
107. kd- at 1753-55. Section 3 of the Insider Trading Law consists of sub-sections
12 through 20, which have the following headings: § 12 Insider Securities (Insider-
papiere), § 13 Insider (Insider), § 14 Prohibition on Insider Trading (Verbot von
Insidergeschdften), § 15 Publication and Communication of course-relevant information
(Ver6ffentlichung und Mitteilung kursbeeinflussender Tatsachen), § 16 Continuous
Surveillance (Laufende U3berwachung), § 17 Analysis and Use of Personal Information
(Verarbeitung and Nutzung personenbezogener Daten), § 18 Criminal Proceedings for
Insider Trading Violations (Strafverfahren bei Insidervergehen), § 19 International
Cooperation (Internationale Zusammenarbeit), and § 20 Exceptions (Ausnahmen).
108. See EC Directive, supra note 60, art. 5 at 31 (providing that articles 2, 3,
and 4 of the EC Directive contain mandatory provisions which Member States must
apply in the drafting of their internal insider trading legislation). These articles es-
tablish minimum standards for the definition of key concepts, such as an insider,
inside information, and transferable securities. Article 2 of the EC Directive contains
the definition of a primary insider and incorporates by reference the definitions of
inside information and transferable securities provided in Article 1. Id. at 31. Article
3 sets forth the insider trading prohibition. Id. Article 4 defines a secondary insider.
Id.
109. See WpHG, supra note 3, § 13(1) at 1753 (defining primary insider); see
also id- § 14(2) at 1753 (defining secondary insider).
110. Id. § 13(1) at 1753 (defining insider information).
111. Id. § 12 at 1753 (defining insider securities).
112. Id. § 14 at 1753 (providing prohibition of insider transactions for primary
and secondary insiders).
AM. U. J. INTL L. & POL'Y
interplay between the sanctions and the enforcement provisions which
the new law proposes, the imposition of which the EC Directive has
largely left to the discretion of the Member States,"' however, is truly
determinative in judging the effectiveness and strength of the new
law.' Before proceeding with this study, a succinct overview of the
prima facie elements of Germany's insider trading prohibition follows.
1. Insiders
Germany's Insider Trading Law follows the lead of the EC Directive
by exempting from its coverage transactions in the interest of monetary,
exchange rate, or deficit management policy."' Specifically, the insider
trading prohibition does not cover securities transactions by the federal
government, a private trust for the federal government, a state (Land),
the German Central Bank, a foreign state, a foreign state's central bank,
other delegated organizations, or any of their representatives." 6
As mandated by the EC Directive, Germany's insider trading prohibi-
tion extends to both primary' " and secondary insiders."' In short,
113. See supra notes 65-66 (citing relevant language of enforcement and penalty
provisions of EC Directive that provide Member States the ability to determine the
proper method of enforcement and the penalties to be applied). The only provisions
which must be adopted in full address the insider trading prohibition. See supra note
108 (describing mandatory measures of EC Directive).
114. See Das Kiinftige, supra note 18, at 204 (noting that a restrictive definition
of insider information or insider securities can limit the scope of an otherwise expan-
sive insider trading prohibition and that the effectiveness and strength of an insider
trading regulation is truly a function of its sanctions and surveillance apparatus).
115. WpHG, supra note 3, § 20 at 1755. Section 20 contains the following excep-
tion to the insider trading prohibition:
Die Vorschriften dieses Abschnitts sind nicht auf Geschiifte anzuwenden, die aus
geld- oder wdhrungspolitischen Griinden oder im; Rahmen der offentlichen
Schuldverwaltung vom Bund, einem seiner Sonderverm6gen, einem Land, der
Deutschen Bundesbank, einem ausliindischen Staat oder dessen Zentralbank oder
einer anderen mit diesen Geschiifen beauftragten Organisation oder mit fir
deren Rechnung handeinden Personen getiitigt werden.
Id. The key concepts of this section are translated in the main body of this text.
Section 20 emulates the language contained in Article 2(4) of the EC Directive which
states, "[t]his Directive shall not apply to transactions carried out in pursuit of mone-
tary, exchange-rate or public debt-management policies by a sovereign State, by its
central bank or any other body designated to that effect by the State, or by any
person acting on their behalf . . . ." EC Directive, supra note 60, at 31.
116. WpHG, supra note 3, § 20 at 1755.
117. A primary insider is defined as follows:
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primary insiders are defined as those persons who have access to and
knowledge of insider information."9 Instead of relying on abstract
analyses or criteria of what constitutes access to insider information,
German legislators provided a clearly-enumerated categorization of par-
ties deemed to have access to insider information." The law divides
insiders with access to insider information into three groups: first, parties
directly affiliated with the source of insider information, namely mem-
bers of the management- or supervisory-committees or general partners
of the issuer or its afffliates; second, parties with access to insider
information due to their position as stockholders of the issuing company
Insider ist, wer-(1) als Mitglied des Geschdiiftsfiihrungs- oder Aufsichtsorgans
oder als persdnlich haftender Gesellschafter des Ermittenten oder eines mit dem
Emittenten verbundenen Unternehmens, (2) aufgrund seiner Beteiligung am
Kapital des Emittenten oder eines mit dem Emittenten verbundenen
Unternehmens oder (3) aufgrund seines Berufs oder seiner Titigkeit oder seiner
Aufgabe bestimmungsgemifl--Kenntnis von einer nicht 6ffentlich bekannren
Tatsache hat ....
Id. § 13(1) at 1753. The key concepts of this section are described and translated in
the main body of this text. The language of § 13(1) of the German Insider Trading
Law closely resembles the definition of a primary insider under Article 2(1) of the
EC Directive, which states the following.
Each Member State shall prohibit any person who: (1) by virtue of his mem-
bership of the administrative, management, or supervisory bodies of the issuer,
(2) by virtue of his holding in the capital of the issuer, or (3) because he has
access to such information by virtue of the exercise of his employment, profes-
sion, or duties, possesses inside information ....
EC Directive, supra note 60, at 31. The only real distinction between the definition
of a primary insider under the EC Directive and the German Insider Trading Law is
that the latter does not include persons who are members of administrative bodies of
the issuer. WpHG, supra note 3, § 13(1) at 1753. The German Insider Trading Law,
however, exceeds the scope of the EC directive by including persons who are mem-
bers of the administrative and management bodies or stockholders of companies affili-
ated with the issuer. Id; see infra notes 137-40 and accompanying text (discussing
further limitations on primary insiders under German law).
118. WpHG, supra note 3, § 14(2) at 1753. Under § 14(2), a secondary insider is
defined as "einem Dritten, der Kenninis von einer Insidertatsache hat... " or, in
English, "a third party, who has knowledge of insider information . .. " Id; see infra
notes 124, 141-43 and accompanying text (discussing definition of and further limita-
tions on secondary insiders).
119. WpHG, supra note 3, § 13(1) at 1753.
120. See Das Kiinftige, supra note 18, at 204 (noting that the German Insider
Trading Law provides a concrete definition of primary insiders).
121. WpHG, supra note 3, § 13(1)(1) at 1753.
158 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y [VOL. 11:1
or its affiliates; and third, parties with access to insider information
due to their occupation, position, or assignment." Secondary insiders,
on the other hand, are simply defined as all other third parties who have
knowledge of insider information. 24
2. Insider Information (Insidertatsache)
As the EC Directive further mandates, Germany's insider trading
prohibition applies only to those primary and secondary insiders trading
on "insider information."'" For information to constitute "insider infor-
122. Id. § 13(l)(2) at 1753.
123. Id. § 13(l)(3) at 1753.
124. Id. § 14(2) at 1753; see also supra note 118 (providing German language
text of § 14(2) and English translation). The definition of secondary insiders under
German law is less precise than the definition of a secondary insider under the EC
Directive, which defines such insiders as "any person other than those referred to
in . . .Article [2] who with full knowledge of the facts possesses inside informa-
tion .... " EC Directive, supra note 60, art. 4 at 31. The main distinction between
the two definitions is that the EC Directive requires "full knowledge" that the infor-
mation possessed constitutes inside information, while the German Insider Trading
Law only requires "knowledge." Id. The distinction between the more general def-
inition of a secondary insider under German law as compared to the EC Directive
may be purely semantic without any true practical implications. While the German
statutory language arguably suggests that secondary insiders with mere knowledge of
insider information will be held strictly liable, German authorities likely will require
some showing of culpability. Commentators have speculated that the German legisla-
tors may have found the "source specification" superfluous in defining secondary
insiders since "inside information is by definition derived from insiders." Standen,
supra note 23, at 202 n.153. The statutory language of the actual insider trading pro-
hibition imposed on secondary insiders under § 14(2), however, clarifies this matter
by suggesting that secondary insiders must knowingly utilize insider information in
order to succumb to liability. See infra notes 142-44 and accompanying text (noting
that only the first of three prohibited insider trading prohibitions applies to secondary
insiders, under which only those secondary insiders with knowledge of insider infor-
mation are prohibited from taking advantage of such knowledge to acquire or sell
insider securities for themselves or others); see also supra note 48 (stating that taking
advantage of one's knowledge of insider information means that one must consciously
or knowingly utilize such information).
With respect to the scope of secondary insiders covered by the German Insider
Trading Law, it is interesting to note that German legislators discarded an initial
proposal to extend secondary insider liability to "third parties who have no direct
access to privileged information" as too controversial. J. Terence Gallagher, Germany
Falls Into Line on Securities Regulation, REmR W. EuR., June 15, 1994.
125. WpHG, supra note 3, § 13(1) at 1753. Insider information is referred to as
an "Insidertatsache" under § 13(1) and is defined as "[Eline[] nicht 6ffentlich
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mation," it must meet three requirements. First, insider information must
be non-public information." The information, however, need not be
material or contain any indicia of trustworthiness.'" Second, the infor-
mation must pertain either to one or several issuers of insider securities
or to the insider securities themselves." Third, the non-public infor-
mation must be capable of considerably influencing the value of an
insider security if it were publicized.' The Insider Trading Law, in
contrast to the EC Directive, specifically exempts information in the
form of an assessment based exclusively on public information from the
bekannte[] Tatsache .... die sich auf einen oder mehrere Ermittenten von
Insiderpapieren oder auf Insiderpapiere bezieht und die geeignet ist, ira Falle ihres
Uffentlichen Bekanntwerdens, den Kurs der Insiderpapiere erheblich zu beeinflussen
(Insidertatsache)." Id. Section 13(1) WpHG closely follows the text of the EC Direc-
tive which states:
"[I]nside information" shall mean information which has not been made public
of a precise nature relating to one or several issuers of transferable securities or
to one or several transferable securities, which, if it were made public, would
be likely to have a significant effect on the price of the transferable security or
securities in question ....
EC Directive, supra note 60, art. 1(1) at 31. The only distinction between the two
definitions is that the EC Directive refers to information of a "precise nature" and
extends the group of securities whose prices may be affected by the release of insider
information to the "securities in question" lI Since these terms are fairly ambiguous
and arguably superfluous, German legislators may have decided to omit them from
their concise definition of insider information. On the other hand, too much statutory
precision may provide an escape route for scrupulous traders. See Standen, supra
note 23, at 203 (noting that the precisely-worded definition of insider information
under German law would create an escape hatch by allowing accused insider traders
to claim their inside information was not factual in nature).
126. WpHG, supra note 3, § 13(1) at 1753.
127. Id; see SCHWARK, supra note 48, at 48 (noting that the law limits the type
of information that may constitute insider information by requiring only that the infor-
mation pertain to an issuer of the security regardless of its degree of trustworthiness).
128. WpHG, supra note 3, § 13(1) at 1753. Information arising from within the
corporate-context easily meets this requirement, while information arising outside of
the corporate-context, which nevertheless affects securities markets and consequently
securities prices, is less easily classified as insider information. SCHWARK, supra
note 3, at 48. Clearly, information relating to political developments that ultimately
affects the price of a security should not constitute issuer-related insider information.
Id. Information relating to capital markets (i.e., fiscal policy information) that influenc-
es the prices of securities, however, should not be as readily excluded from the law's
coverage. Id. Since such information is generally released to the public on regular
intervals, it is much easier for insiders to anticipate when securities price fluctuations
will occur and how to profit from such fluctuations. Id.
129. WpHG, supra note 3, § 13(1) at 1753.
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category of "insider information," even if such assessment is capable of
influencing the value of an insider security. 3 '
3. Insider Securities (Insiderpapiere)
Germany's insider trading prohibition further falls in line with the EC
Directive by covering only insider information pertaining to "insider
securities" or issuers of "insider securities.' 3' While section 12 of the
130. Id. Section 13(2) provides that "Eine Bewertung, die ausschliesslich aufgrund
iffentlich bekannter Tatsachen erstellt wird, ist keine Insidertatsache, selbst wenn sic
den Kurs von Insiderpapieren erheblich beeinflussen kann." Id. The main text accom-
panying this note summarizes the content of this section. While the EC Directive
contains no comparable provision to limit the scope of insider information under
Article 1(1), assessments based exclusively on publicly-known information, neverthe-
less, would fall outside of the scope of insider information under Article 1(1) because
they do not contain non-public information.
131. WpHG, supra note 3, § 12 at 1753. Section 12 defines insider securities
(Insiderpapiere) as follows:
(1) Insiderpapiere sind Wertpapiere, die 1. an einer inldndischen Bdrse zum
Handel zugelassen oder in den Freiverkehr einbezogen sind, oder 2. in einem
anderen Mitgliedstaat der Europaischen Gemeinschaften oder einem anderen
Vertragsstaat des Abkommens iUber den Europiiischen Wirtschaftsraum zun Han-
del an einem Markt im Sinne des § 2 Abs. I zugelassen sind. Der Zulassung
zum Handel an einem Markt im Sinne von § 2 Abs. I oder der Einbeziehung
in den Freiverkehr steht gleich, wenn der Antrag auf Zulassung oder
Einbeziehung gestellt oder dffentlich angekiindigt ist.
(2) Als Insiderpapiere gelten auch 1. Rechte auf Zeichnung, Erwerb oder
Verduyferung von Wertpapieren, 2. Rechte auf Zahlung eines Differenzbetrages,
der sich an der Wertentwickelung von Wertpapieren bemil8t, 3. Terminkontrakte
auf einen Aktien- oder Rentenindex oder Zinsterminkontrakte (Finanzterminkon-
trakte) so wie Rechte auf Zeichnung, Erwerb oder Verdiuferung von
Finanzterminkontrakten, sofern die Finanzterminkontrakte Wertpapiere zum
Gegenstand haben oder sich auf einen Index beziehen, in den Wertpapiere
einbezogen sind, 4. sonstige Tenninkontrakte, die zum Erwerb oder zur
Verduflerung von Wertpapieren verpflichten ....
Id; see infra notes 132-35 and accompanying text (explaining the concept of "insider
securities" under German law). Section 12 is comparable to Article 1(2) of the EC
Directive which labels "insider securities" as "transferable securities":
"[Tiransferable securities" shall mean: (a) shares and debt securities, as well as
securities equivalent to shares and debt securities; (b) contracts or rights to
subscribe for, acquire or dispose of securities referred to in (a); (c) futures con-
tracts, options and financial futures in respect of securities referred to in (a);
(d) index contracts in respect of securities referred to in (a), when admitted to
trading on a market which is regulated and supervised by authorities recognized
by public bodies, operates regularly and is accessible directly or indirectly to
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German Insider Trading Law provides a fairly complex, and arguably
cumbersome, definition of insider securities,' the insider trading pro-
hibition basically extends to all securities traded on an exchange or
through a transaction otherwise covered by the Insider Trading Law."
Specifically, securities listed either on the official or a regulated market
in Germany, traded on the over-the-counter market in Germany, or listed
on an exchange of a European Union Member State, constitute insider
securities."M Furthermore, insider securities include stocks, certificates
representing stocks, bonds, notes, debt instruments, stock options, and
other securities comparable to stocks or bonds."' Moreover, parties
cannot circumvent the insider trading prohibition by investing in deriva-
tives since derivative instruments come within the scope of insider secu-
rities under section 12(2).'
the public.
EC Directive, supra note 60, at 31. The definition of insider securities under German
law encompasses the measures mandated by the EC Directive. Id. In fact, the scope
of an "insider security" under § 12 appears to exceed the scope of a "tansferable
security" under Article 2 of the EC Directive in two respects. First, the German
Insider Trading Law covers securities traded on the over-the-counter (OTC) market
(Freiverkehr) even though OTC trade does not take place on a "market which is
regulated and supervised" by competent regulatory authorities, as envisioned by the
EC Directive. See Das Kiinftige, supra note 18, at 205 (making this point); see also
M6ller, supra note 10, at 102 (noting that the inclusion of securities traded OTC in
the insider trading prohibition is important because investors do not distinguish wheth-
er insider trading violations occur in the trade of listed securities or OTC securities
and repeated occurrences of insider trading violations on the OTC trade, therefore,
could jeopardize all regulated trade). Second, the EC Directive does not expressly
cover derivative instruments as does § 12(2). See infra note 136 and accompanying
text (discussing WpHG's coverage of derivative instruments).
132. See Das Kfinftige, supra note 18, at 205 (noting that § 12 offers a fairly
complex definition of what constitutes insider securities).
133. WpHG, supra note 3, § 12(1) at 1753.
134. Id; see SCHWARK, supra note 48, at 48 (noting that the determinative criteria
in deciding what constitutes an insider security is whether such security is listed for
trade on a market, not whether the security transaction in question actually took place
through such market); see also Das Kiinftige, supra note 18, at 205 (stating that the
definition of insider securities extends to the gambit of securities admitted to trade on
a German exchange or traded over-the-counter, as well as those traded on a securities
market of an European Union Member State that is regulated by a competent state
authority).
135. WpHG, supra note 3, § 12(2) at 1753.
136. Id. § 12(2) at 1753; see Muller, supra note 10, at 102 (noting that parties
will not be able to circumvent the insider trading prohibition by investing in deriva-
tives since § 12(2) clearly states that so-called derivative instruments constitute insider
1996]
162 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y [VOL. 11:1
4. Insider Transactions
As the EC Directive requires, the German Insider Trading Law places
a three-part prohibition on primary insiders in their use of insider infor-
mation."7 First, the law prohibits primary insiders from taking advan-
tage of their knowledge of insider information' to acquire or dispose
securities).
137. WpHG, supra note 3, § 14 at 1753. Section 14 proscribes three types of
insider transactions by primary insiders:
(1) Einem Insider ist es verboten, 1. unter Ausnutzung seiner Kenntnis von
einer Insidertatsache Insiderpapiere fiir eigene oder fremde Rechnung oder fir
einen anderen zu erwerben oder zu veraiufiern, 2. einem anderen eine
Insidertatsache unbefiigt mitzuteilen oder zuginglich zu machen, 3. einem
anderen auf der Grundlage seiner Kennmis von einer Insidertatsache den
Erwerb oder die Verduflerung von Insiderpapieren zu empfehlen.
Id; see infra notes 138-41 and accompanying text (explaining three-part prohibition on
primary insiders under § 14). Section 14 is modeled after Articles 2 and 3 of the EC
Directive. The only exception is that the first use prohibition leave included in Article
2, and the second and third prohibitions on communications and recommendations, re-
spectively, are included in Article 3 of the EC Directive. EC Directive, supra note
60, at 31. Article 2 provides that:
1. Each Member State shall prohibit any person who: . . . possesses inside
information from taking advantage of that information with full knowledge of
the facts by acquiring or disposing of for his own account or for the account
of a third party, either directly or indirectly, transferable securities of the issuer
or issuers to which that information relates.
Id. While Article 2 of EC Directive refers to the "direct[] or indirect[]" acquisition or
disposal of securities, id. § 14(1)(1), refers only to the acquisition or disposal of
securities "for ones own or a foreign account or for someone else." WpHG, supra
note 3, § 14 at 1753. Article 3 of the EC Directive provides that:
Each Member State shall prohibit any person subject to the prohibition laid
down in Article 2 who possesses inside information from: (a) disclosing that
inside information to any third party unless such disclosure is made in the
normal course of the exercise of his employment, profession or duties;
(b) recommending or procuring a third party, on the basis of that inside infor-
mation, to acquire or dispose of transferable securities admitted to trading on its
securities markets as referred to in Article 1(2) in fine.
EC Directive, supra note 60, at 31. While § 14(l)(2) limits the primary insider's
communication of insider information to authorized uses, Article 3(a) of the EC Di-
rective clearly delineates situations in which such communications are authorized (i.e.,
in the normal course of employment, etc.). Section 14(l)(3) contains language largely
identical to Article 3(b) of the EC Directive.
138. See SCHWARK, supra note 48, at 50 (noting the requirement that insiders
"take advantage of their knowledge" of insider information means that they must
knowingly utilize insider information).
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of insider securities for themselves or others."" Second, it prohibits
primary insiders from informing or providing others with access to the
insider information without authorization." Third, the law prohibits
primary insiders from using their knowledge of insider information to
recommend to others the acquisition or sale of insider securities.''
Reflecting the scope of the EC Directive, secondary insiders are deci-
sively less restricted in their use of insider information than primary
insiders because only the first of the three aforementioned prohibitions
applies to secondary insiders.'" Secondary insiders are simply prohibit-
ed from using insider information to acquire or sell insider securities for
themselves or others.'43 They are not prohibited from furnishing others
with insider information, or from making recommendations to others on
the purchase or sale of insider securities based on such insider informa-
tion.'"
Overall, the German insider trading prohibition is expansive in its
coverage of insiders, insider information, insider securities, and insider
transactions." It contains few, if any, apparent gaps.'" Furthermore,
139. WpHG, supra note 3, § 14(1)(1) at 1753.
140. Id. § 14(1)(2) at 1753; see SCHWARK, supra note 48, at 51 (noting that the
concept of authorization is problematic and finding that communications of insider
information are not "unauthorized" when parties are acting strictly within the scope of
their employment and, arguably, are "unauthorized" when parties are acting only in
the interest of the corporation).
141. WpHG, supra note 3, § 14(1)(3) at 1753.
142. Id. § 14(2) at 1753. Section 14(2) prescribes transactions by secondary in-
siders as "(2) Einem Dritten, der Kenntnis von einer Insidertaisache hat, ist es verbo-
ten, unter Ausniitzung dieser Kenntnis Insiderpapiere fir eigene oder fremde Rechnung
oder fir einen anderen zu erwerben oder zu verduflern." Id; see supra notes 118,
124 and accompanying text (translating prohibition on secondary insider transactions
contained in § 14(2)). The prohibition on transactions by secondary insiders contained
in § 14(2) of the German Insider Trading Law closely resembles the use prohibition
under Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the EC Directive, which applies to secondary insiders.
EC Directive, supra note 60, at 31.
143. WpHG, supra note 3, § 14(2) at 1753.
144. Id; see Scharrenberg, supra note 86, at 92 (noting that German legislators
were considering whether to extend the recommendation prohibition to secondary
insiders and speculating that they probably would drop this proposal as too expan-
sive).
145. See supra notes 114-44 and accompanying text (discussing four elements of
insider trading prohibition).
146. See infra notes 220-22 and accompanying text (discussing the applicability of
laws to government insiders leaking economic data capable of influencing entire finan-
cial markets); see also infra notes 221-23 and accompanying text (addressing difficulty
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the prohibition unequivocally complies with the measures mandated by
the EC Directive and arguably expands beyond the scope of insider lia-
bility under United States law, particularly with respect to the formula-
tion of tippee or secondary insider liability. 47
C. THREE-TIERED ENFORCEMENT STRUCTURE
The new Insider Trading Law envisions a three-tiered surveillance
structure on the federal, state (Lander), and exchange level.'48 The
law's coverage extends to both unlisted or over-the-counter trade
(Freiverkehr), and listed trade 49 on Germany's eight regional stock
exchanges. 5'
in determining whether information arising in the non-corporate context, such as the
interest rate policy of the Central Bank, which is released at regular intervals and
directly affects the securities markets, falls within the scope of insider information).
147. See Donald C. Langevoort, Defining Insider Trading: The Experience in Oth-
er Countries, 6 INSIGHTS 7 (1992) (concluding that the scope of insider trading prohi-
bition in EC Directive, as well as in Japan, Great Britain, and Australia, is broader
than the United States version, particularly with respect to secondary insiders).
148. See Netzer, supra note 52 (discussing three-tiered level of market supervision
and the respective functions of each); Bdrsenaufsicht mit Biss erwiinscht-4m Jahre
1995 soll Frankfurt internationalen Anschluss bekommen [Securities Supervisory Au-
thority with Bite Sought-4n the Year 1995, Frankfurt Will Gain International Accep-
tance], SZ, Sept. 27, 1994 [hereinafter Bdrsenaufsicht] (describing three-tiers of market
surveillance); Bei Insidergeschiift bis zu fiinf Jahre Gefdngnis-Bonn legt Gesetzentwurf
zur Finanzmarktfdrderung vor-Neues Aufsichtsamt geplant [Up to Five Years Prison
Term for Insider Trading-Bonn Presents Proposed Law For Promoting the Financial
Marketplace-New Supervisory Office is Planned], SZ, July 13, 1993 (discussing three
levels of market supervision from planning perspective).
149. WpHG, supra note 3, § 16 at 1754 (providing that Federal Supervisory Of-
fice conducts continuous surveillance over listed and unlisted securities businesses); cf.
Blum, supra note 18, at 510-11 (indicating that under Germany's prior voluntary com-
pliance system only listed securities, officially traded on the exchanges, fell under the
jurisdiction of the Stock Exchange Act, while the trading of regulated, unlisted or
non-regulated, unlisted securities was subject only to limited self-regulation).
150. See Blum, supra note 18, at 507 n.3 (identifying Germany's eight regional
exchanges as Frankfurt, Duisseldorf, Munich, Hamburg, Berlin, Hanover, Stuttgart, and
Bremen). Of the eight exchanges, Frankfurt is the largest and most active, clearing
over 73% of the total of DM 7,486 billion in trading activity in Germany last year.
Die Bdrsen in Frankfurt, Diisseldorf und Miinchen planen eine enge Kooperation [The
Exchanges in Frankfurt, Diisseldorf and Munich plan tight cooperation], SZ, May 9,
1995. The D0sseldorf Exchange comes in second place, engaging in approximately
DM 732 billion in trading activity last year. Id. The Bavarian Exchange in Munich is
in third place with approximately DM 371 billion. Id. The remaining market share of
around 12% is spread among the other five exchanges in 1994. Id.
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1. Federal Supervisory Office
The German Parliament delegated the principal power for enforcing
Germany's Insider Trading Law to the newly-created Federal Superviso-
ry Office for Securities Trading (Federal Supervisory Office)."' The
Federal Supervisory Office is a self-funding, independent government
agency within the jurisdiction of the Federal Ministry of Finance.""
The federal government has the power to appoint the agency's President
with the advice of the state governments." The Federal Supervisory
Office officially began operating on January 1, 1995,' in
Frankfurt56 with a limited staff and budget."s
151. WpHG, supra note 3, §§ 3-11 at 1750-53 (setting forth the organisation,
functions, and funding of the Federal Supervisory Office).
152. Id. § 11(1) at 1752 (distributing cost coverage for expenses relating to the
Federal Supervisory Office as follows: 75% to credit institutes located in Germany;
5% to exchange brokers, independent brokers, and other companies listed on the ex-
change; 10% to issuers located in Germany whose securities are listed on a German
exchange).
153. Id. § 3(1) at 1750 (stating that the Federal Supervisory Office shall be es-
tablished under the jurisdiction of the Federal Ministry of Finance).
154. Id. § 3(2) at 1750 (stating that the President of the Federal Republic of
Germany shall appoint the head of the Federal Supervisory Office on behalf of the
federal government with the advice of the competent state ministries). In October
1994, German authorities appointed Georg Wittich, a former Finance Ministry official
responsible for the supervision of international securities matters, to head the Federal
Supervisory Office. Ministerialrat Wittich zum Chef des Bdrsen.Aufsichtsamtes ernannt
[Minister Wittich Appointed to Head the Federal Supervisory Office), SZ, Oct. 14,
1994; see Ascarelli, supra note 35, at 9 (noting that Georg Wittich is the Finance
Ministry's connection to the International Organization of Securities Commissions and
is thought to be well-suited to promote Germany's new hard-line approach against
insider trading to foreign investors); Tally-Ho, supra note 55, at 24 (citing Mr.
Wittich's view that tough legal penalties and a new enforcement authority with broad
investigatory powers are a sufficient deterrent to insider dealings and just as important
as actual punishment); Equity, supra note 46, at 82 (stating that the possibility of
appointing Rudiger von Rosen, former Chairman of the Deutsche B6rse AG, to the
head of the agency was quickly discarded because von Rosen is "too closely associat-
ed with the German banks and... the authorities wish to portray the stock ex-
change as an institution which has grown beyond the control of a handful of German
bankers").
155. FmFG, supra note 2, art. 20 at 1784 (stating that § 3 (organisation of Fed-
eral Supervisory Office), § 9(3) and (4) (select powers of Federal Ministry of Finance
concerning disclosure duty), § 11 (costs), and other select provisions not applicable to
the Federal Supervisory Office shall become effective on August, 1, 1994, while all
other provisions shall take effect on January 1, 1995).
156. See, e.g., Bdrsenpolizei und Strukturreform stdrken den Finanzplatz Frankfurt
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a. Enforcement Powers
The Federal Supervisory Office has extensive investigatory and sur-
veillance powers to ensure compliance with the Insider Trading Law
and, as a result, the proper functioning of Germany's securities mar-
kets.'58 To help the Federal Supervisory Office meet its broad enforce-
ment mandate, 59 German legislators took a dual approach. They pro-
vided the agency with expansive investigatory powers, on one hand, im-
posed expansive disclosure requirements on market participants, on the
other hand." ° The agency has four central surveillance and compulsory
duties under the Insider Trading Law.
(1) Insider Trading Investigations
The Federal Supervisory Office is primarily responsible for the inves-
tigation of insider trading violations. 6' To assist the agency with its
[Securities Regulators and Structural Reform Strengthen the Financial Marketplace
Frtankfurt], SZ, Dec. 11, 1993 (noting that Frankfurt, future home of the European
Monetary Institute, a precursor of the planned European Central Bank, was unani-
mously chosen as the site of the Federal Supervisory Authority by a commission
composed of the federation and the states in the face of competition from other cities
such as Bremen and Leipzig); Die Borsen in Frankfurt, supra note 150 (noting that
the Frankfurt Exchange is Germany's largest exchange, conducting 74% of Germany's
total stock exchange business in 1994); Tally-Ho, supra note 55, at 24 (noting that
the Frankfurt Exchange is the world's fourth largest exchange).
157. See Tally-Ho, supra note 55, at 24 (explaining that the Agency began operat-
ing with a core staff of 30 to 40 people in November 1994, and an annual budget of
DM 12 million ($7.6 million)).
158. WpHG, supra note 3, § 4 at 1750 (defining broad duties of the Federal Su-
pervisory Office in the enforcement of the Insider Trading Law, i.e., preventing prob-
lems from arising that may impair an orderly securities trade and cause considerable
disadvantages for the securities markets).
159. Id.
160. Id. § 16 at 1754 (covering primary investigatory powers of the Federal Su-
pervisory Office); see id. §§ 9 and 15 at 1751-54 (containing Insider Trading Law's
key provisions mandating disclosure of information to the Federal Supervisory Office,
namely the disclosure or reporting duty (Meldepflicht) and the Ad Hoc Publicity duty
(Ver6ffentlichung und Mitteilung kursbeeinflussender Tatsachen) respectively).
161. Id. § 4 at 1750 (granting primary enforcement powers under the Insider
Trading Law to the Federal Supervisory Office); see id. § 16(1) at 1754 (stating that
the Federal Supervisory Office supervises the listed and unlisted trade in insider secu-
rities in order to enforce the insider trading prohibition under § 14); see supra note
137 and accompanying text (providing information on the scope of the insider trading
prohibition under § 14).
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investigatory role, the Insider Trading Law imposes an expansive and,
arguably, unwieldy mandatory disclosure requirement on all credit insti-
tutes with headquarters in Germany, their foreign-located branch offices,
and other market participants.'" These entities must disclose their
transactions in securities and derivative instruments on markets within
the scope of the Insider Trading Law to the Federal Supervisory Office
on a daily basis." The federal agency must verify whether these enti-
ties have complied with this disclosure requirement every year.'" The
Insider Trading Law imposes substantial fines on entities that intention-
ally or recklessly fail to comply with the disclosure requirement.'"
If the Federal Supervisory Office has a valid suspicion of an insider
trading violation, the agency, under its continuous surveillance function,
may make further inquiries into the securities transactions giving rise to
the suspicion.'" For example, the agency may request disclosure of the
principal's identity.167 In this context, the agency may demand the pro-
duction of documentation from the suspected parties or access to their
business premises.'" Furthermore, the Federal Supervisory Office, un-
der a valid suspicion of an insider trading violation, may make inquiries
of issuers of insider securities and their affiliates, who are located in
Germany or whose securities are listed on German exchanges, as well as
- 162. Id. § 9(1) at 1751-52 (containing disclosure duty (Meldepfichten)); see
Scharrenberg, supra note 86, at 91 (noting that the authorities will carry a large tech-
nical and administrative task in evaluating the large amount of information with which
the respective credit institutes and other entities will supply them on a daily basis and
noting that the credit institutes alone engage in 60,000 to 70,000 securities transac-
tions daily).
163. WpHG, supra note 3, § 9(1) at 1751-52.
164. Id. § 36(1) at 1759.
165. Id. §§ 39(1)(1.)(a), 39(3) at 1759-60 (imposing fine not in excess of DM
100,000 on entities that intentionally or recklessly fail to make a disclosure as man-
dated under § 9 or make such a disclosure in an incorrect, incomplete, improperly
formatted, or untimely manner).
166. Id. § 16(2) at 1754 (granting continuous surveillance powers to the Federal
Supervisory Office which are triggered only if the Federal Supervisory Office has a
"substantiated suspicion" of an insider trading violation under § 14 (Anhaltspunkte Mr
einen VerstoB)).
167. Id. (stating that the Federal Supervisory Office may request the identity of
the principal as long as the agency's inquiries address insider securities which give
rise to the suspicion of an insider violation or whose prices are dependent on such
securities).
168. Id. § 16(3) at 1754 (granting power to Federal Supervisory office to demand
production of documents and access to the business premises of the entities who are
subject to the disclosure duty under § 9).
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other persons with knowledge of insider information." 9 Under its con-
tinuous surveillance function, the Insider Trading Law imposes substan-
tial fines on parties who intentionally or negligently fail to comply with
the federal agency's requests for information, documentation, or access
to business premises.7 '
If the Federal Supervisory Office ascertains facts confirming the suspi-
cion that an insider trading violation has occurred, the agency must refer
the matter to the competent state attorney's office for prosecution.'
The Insider Trading Law imposes extensive criminal sanctions and fines
on primary and secondary insiders convicted of violating the insider
trading prohibition."
(2) Surveillance of Ad Hoc Publicity
The Federal Supervisory Office is also responsible for supervision of
the ad hoc publicity requirement. Under this requirement, issuers, absent
a waiver, must disclose all potentially market-moving information to the
investing public via exchange newspapers and electronic information sys-
tems. 73 The Federal Supervisory Office may make inquiries of, de-
mand documentation from, and enter business premises of issuers to
169. Id. § 16(4) at 1754 (stating conditions under which Federal Supervisory Of-
fice may question issuers or persons with knowledge of insider information about
insider information or about other persons who have knowledge of such information).
170. Id. §§ 39(2), 39(3) at 1760 (imposing fines up to DM 100,000 for intention-
ally or negligently not complying with Federal Supervisory Office's request for infor-
mation, documentation, or access to business premises under § 16).
171. Id. § 18(l) at 1754 (setting forth the standard for criminal referral).
172. Id. § 38 at 1759 (mandating the imposition of a five year prison term or the
disgorgement of profits on primary and secondary insiders and noting that a compara-
ble foreign criminal sanction may be substituted for such sanction).
173. Id. § 15(1) at 1753 (stating ad hoc publicity requirement and noting that the
Federal Supervisory Office may exempt an issuer from this requirement if the infor-
mation to be disclosed may harm the issuer); see id. § 15(2) at 1753-54 (providing
that the issuer, prior to making the mandated public disclosure, must provide the
potentially-market moving information to the exchanges on which the issuer's securi-
ties or derivatives based on such securities are listed and to the Federal Supervisory
Office so that these authorities may determine whether the trading of such securities
should be halted); see id. § 15(3) at 1754 (describing means of disclosure); see also
Bernhard Pellens & Rolf Uwe F0lbier, Publizitiitspflichten nach dem
Wertpapierhandelsgesetz [Publication Duties under the Insider Trading Law], 28 DER
BEMIEB 1381 (1994) (providing an extensive evaluation of the ad hoc publicity re-
quirement under § 15 and making a comparative analysis to disclosure requirements
in Great Britain and the United States).
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determine if the requirements of ad hoc disclosure have been met." If
issuers fail to publicize relevant information in the manner and time
frame required by the Insider Trading Law, the exchanges may halt the
trading of the issuer's stock for a short period until the relevant infor-
mation has been properly disseminated to the public. 75 The Insider
Trading Law imposes large fines on parties who fail to comply with
either the ad hoc publicity requirement or the federal agency's requests
for information, documentation, or searches.'76
Commentators have noted that the concept of ad hoc publicity is by
far one of the most important provisions contained in the Insider Trad-
ing Law." Its purpose is to provide the public with immediate access
to potentially market-moving information, and thereby serve as a preven-
tive measure against insider trading."7 While the rationale underlying
174. WpHG, supra note 3, § 15(5) at 1754.
175. B6rsengesetz [Stock Exchange Act], in FmFG, supra note 2, § 43 at 1760,
1761 [hereinafter B6rsG] (permitting trading halts for the protection of investors even
despite the publication of market-relevant information); Deutschland: FIWB-
Aussetzungsregeln an Ad-Hoc-Regeln Anpassen [Germany: Financial Market News-
Adapting Trading Halt Rules to Ad-Hoc Rules), REUTER GE.u%1AN NEws, Apr. 27,
1995 (citing department head of the Deutsche B6rse AG, Arno Thielemann, as stating
that since legislators failed to consider the trading halt requirements under B~rsG's
§ 43 when enacting NVpHG's § 15, one should take the ad hoc provision into ac-
count when contemplating trading halts; therefore, German exchanges may not be
required to stop the trading of securities under § 43 if companies release their mar-
ket-moving information over electronic media as required by § 15).
176. WpHG, supra note 3, §§ 39(2), 39(3) at 1760 (imposing a fine not in excess
of DM 100,000 for intentionally or recklessly not complying with the federal agency's
information, document, or search request, or for doing so in an incorrect, incomplete,
improperly formatted, or untimely manner); see id. §§ 39(l)(2)(a), 39(3) at 1759-60
(imposing a fine not in excess of DM 3 million for intentionally or recklessly not
complying with ad hoc publicity requirement or for doing so in an incorrect, incom-
plete, improperly formatted, or untimely manner); see id. §§ 39(l)(3), 39(3) at 1760
(imposing a fine not in excess of DM 3 million for intentionally or recklessly not
disclosing potentially-market moving information to the public through an electronic
information service or for doing so in an incorrect, incomplete, improperly formatted,
or untimely manner).
177. SCHWARK, supra note 48, at 52 (noting that the ad hoc publicity requirement
is the most important measure of the insider trading prohibition since it attempts to
make insider transactions obsolete).
178. See Das Kiinftige, supra note 18, at 206 (noting that ad hoc publicity is
based on the rationale that the quickest possible public disclosure of non-public mate-
rial information erodes the basis for insider transactions); Moller, supra note 10, at
108 (finding that ad hoc publicity is a measure intended to prevent the misuse of
insider information).
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the ad hoc publicity requirement is sound, the practical implementation
of ad hoc disclosure has been troublesome."" The requirement has
caused much confusion within the business community, 8° has resulted
in several trading halts to date,'' and arguably, may be evaded by
clever insiders." As of April 1994, the Federal Supervisory Office has
demonstrated its uncertainty over the requirement of ad hoc publicity by
abstaining from imposing any fines on German companies for non-com-
pliance, despite inconsistent adherence to the new requirement.'
179. See SCHWARK, supra note 48, at 52 (stating that experts have questioned the
effectiveness of the ad hoc publicity requirement as a preventive measure against
insider trading).
180. See Deutschland: Wenig Licht im Paragraphen-Dschungel [Germany: Little
Light in the Jungle of Paragraphs], NEuE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG [NZZ], Nov. 1, 1994
(noting that Deutsche Brse AG's recently released pamphlet (Leitfaden) assisting
companies on which information to publicize under the ad hoc publicity requirement
demonstrates how hard it is to understand this disclosure requirement); see also In
Deutschland herrscht grosse Unsicherheit [In Germany, Great Uncertainty Abounds],
SZ, Aug. 3, 1994 (noting that many companies do not exactly know what information
they must provide or to whom, before they inform the exchanges, the Federal Super-
visory Office, and the effected public).
181. See Deutschland: Borse Ab Neu Jahr Mit Neuer Aussetzungspraxis [Germany:
Exchange After New Year with Trade-Halting Practice], REUTER, Dec. 15, 1994 (not-
ing that until the end of 1994, the exchanges will halt trading of a stock if the pub-
lic, including private investors, is not informed of market-moving information through
a stock exchange newspaper (Brsenpflichtblatt), but after January 1, 1995, the Frank-
furt Exchange will only require that the affected public (Bereichs6ffentlichtkeit) be
informed of potentially market-moving information); Aussetzungen verstdren die
Anleger [Trading Halts Disturb Investors], SZ, Dec. 16, 1994 (stating that the Frank-
furt exchange halted the trading of Schaerf AG and Roder Zeltsysteme AG for failing
to meet the timeliness requirement of the ad hoc publicity and thereby caused much
confusion in the business community about their publicity duties).
182. See SCHWARK, supra note 48, at 52 (noting that insiders may circumvent ad
hoc publicity measures by moving their insider activities ahead to an earlier time-
frame, at which the course-relevant circumstance has not yet become a fact).
183. See Margit Thomann, Deutschland: Schwieriger Urngang mit Ad-Hoc-Publizitit
[Germany: Difficult Dealings with Ad-Hoc-Publicity], REUTER GERMAN NEWS,
Apr. 30, 1995 (citing official of the Federal Supervisory Office, JOrgen Oberfrank,
stating that the office has dealt generously with possible violations of the ad hoc
publicity requirement. It further noted that heavily-traded companies, such as the
Commerzbank and Siemens, purposely disregarded ad hoc publicity with respect to
marginally course-relevant information on prior occasions, while instead publishing the
news through their established press connections).
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(3) Mutual Cooperation
The Federal Supervisory Office is responsible for cooperating with
competent European Community and foreign securities enforcement
authorities in the enforcement of insider trading violations under the
German Insider Trading Law or foreign laws."' Specifically, the Fed-
eral Supervisory Office is in charge of obtaining information requested
by other enforcement authorities and transmitting such information to
them." The agency may use its compulsory powers to secure the re-
quested information."t The agency also has the authority to deny mu-
tual assistance on two grounds: if the release of information could jeop-
ardize the sovereignty, security, and public order of the Federal Republic
of Germany, and if German authorities have already initiated a judicial
proceeding into the subject matter of the request or have issued a final
decision on the matter."
(4) Administrative Law Making Power
The Federal Supervisory Office has the express authority to issue
regulations for the purpose of remedying abuses that impair the orderly
trading of securities or that may significantly disadvantage the stock
market." While the Insider Trading Law offers no real guidance on
the potential content of such regulations, the law does provide that the
regulations may broaden the scope of the Federal Supervisory Office's
duties and powers," 9 but only to the extent that they do not interfere
184. See WpHG, supra note 3, § 19 at 1755 (providing for international coopera-
tion); see also id. § 19(5) at 1755 (stating that Federal Supervisory Office may coop-
erate with other enforcement agencies in the enforcement of insider trading prohibi-
tions under German or foreign law).
185. Id. § 19(1) at 1755 (stating that Federal Supervisory Authority may transmit
requested information to other competent enforcement authorities and that the agency
may utilize its compulsory powers under § 16(2) in order to execute the foreign
request for assistance).
186. Id.
187. Id. § 19(3) at 1755 (setting forth reasons under which The Federal Superviso-
ry Office may refuse to execute a foreign request for assistance).
188. Id. § 4(1) at 1750 (stating that the Federal Supervisory Office may issue reg-
ulations to remedy "abuses ... which jeopardize the orderly performance of the
securities trade or could bring about considerable disadvantages for the securities mar-
ket").
189. See WpHG, supra note 3, § 16(l) at 1754 (providing the Federal Supervisory
Office with practically unlimited jurisdiction over the enforcement of insider trading
violations). Furthermore, the law gives the Federal Supervisory Office free reign to
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with areas of competence explicitly reserved to either the states"g or
the exchanges under the Second Financial Markets Promotion Act.''
The Federal Supervisory Office may use the compulsory measures
available under German administrative law to compel compliance with
the regulations that the agency promulgates and may impose extensive
fines for non-compliance."
b. Securities Council
The Insider Trading Law mandates the creation of a Securities Coun-
cil (Wertpapierrat) within the Federal Supervisory Office, consisting of
representatives from each state." The Council primarily has an adviso-
ry role focusing particularly on newly-issued regulations, enforcement
decisions affecting exchange and market structures, and questions con-
cerning the respective areas of competence of the Federal Supervisory
Office and the state supervisory authorities.'94 The Securities Council
must meet at least once a year. 95 Overall, the Securities Council
seek the assistance of other persons and offices in meeting its expansive enforcement
task. Id. § 6(1) at 1751. Under the Insider Trading Law, and absent any constitutional
considerations, the insider trading enforcement powers of the Federal Supervisory
Office supersede the limited enforcement duties delegated to the regional and ex-
change authorities. Compare supra notes 158-87 and accompanying text (describing
broad enforcement and rule-making powers of the FSA) with infra notes 196-206
(describing lesser powers of regional and exchange authorities).
190. See FmFG, supra note 2, art. 2, § 1 at 1760-61 (listing Regional Authority's
powers under the amended Stock Exchange Act).
191. Id. art. 2, § lb at 1761 (containing functions and powers of Exchange Au-
thorities under the amended Stock Exchange Act).
192. WpHG, supra note 3, § 10 at 1752 (describing compulsory powers that the
Federal Supervisory Authority may employ in enforcing agency regulations and noting
that the federal agency may impose fines up to DM 50,000 for non-compliance).
193. Id. § 5(1) at 1750.
194. Id. § 5(2) at 1750 (stating that the Securities Council will assist in the en-
forcement of the Insider Trading Law and describing particular areas in which Coun-
cil will have an advisory role).
195. Id. § 5(3) at 1750. The President of the Federal Supervisory Office must call
the meetings of the Securities Council at least once a year and at other times upon
the request of a third of its members. Id. The Insider Trading Law authorizes repre-
sentatives of the Federal Ministries of Finance, Justice, and Economics, the German
Central Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank), and the Federal Supervisory Office for Banking
Regulation to attend such meetings. Id. § 5(1) at 1750. In addition, leading industry
exports may testify at meetings of the Securities Council. Id.
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serves as a state government check on the expansive powers of the
Federal Supervisory Office.
2. States (Ldnder)
The Federal Supervisory Office may seek the assistance of the Re-
gional Exchange Supervisory Authorities (Regional Authorities) at the
state level, which previously oversaw Germany's eight stock exchanges
in carrying out the agency's duties under the Insider Trading Law.'"
Specifically, the Regional Authorities must assist the Federal Supervisory
Office in urgent matters involving the enforcement of Germany's insider
trading prohibition."9 Individual agreements between the Federal Su-
pervisory Office and the respective Regional Authorities shall govern
mutual cooperation between such state and federal authorities in the
enforcement of insider trading violations. 98
The Regional Authorities have other duties and powers with respect to
general market surveillance under the amended Stock Exchange Act.'"
For example, the Regional Authorities are responsible for supervising the
exchanges, the corporations listed on the exchanges, and the broker-
dealers.' They must enforce exchange rules and maintain orderly trad-
ing practices on the exchanges.' To carry out these duties, Regional
Authorities have extensive powers to initiate inspections, make inquiries,
and request documents. 3 In furtherance of their surveillance duty,
they may conduct searches of the business premises of the exchange and
its participants during regular business hours and, at other times, only to
prevent immediate danger to public safety.' Finally, Regional Author-
196. Id. § 6(2) at 1751 (stating that the Regional Authorities (B~rsenauf-
sichtsbeh6rden) must assist the Federal Supervisory Office in urgent matters involving
the enforcement of insider trading violations at their respective exchanges).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. B6rsG, supra note 175, at 1760-70.
200. Id. § 1(2) at 1760 (stating that the Regional Authority carries out the surveil-
lance over the exchange, which includes ensuring that the exchange rules and regula-
tions are complied with and that an orderly trade is maintained).
201. Id. § la(1) at 1761 (stating that the Regional Authority may request docu-
ments from or search business premises of various market participants, such as com-
panies listed at the exchange and broker-dealers).
202. Id. § 1(2) at 1760 (explaining the Regional Authority's surveillance duties).
203. Id., § la(1) at 1761 (setting forth powers of the Regional Authorities to
request documents from and search business premises of exchange participants).
204. Id. (stating conditions under which Regional Authorities may search the busi-
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ities have a rulemaking power of their own. 5 They may impose regu-
lations on the exchanges and their participants in order to enforce com-
pliance with exchange rules, or to prevent or remedy other abuses."°
3. Exchanges
On the exchange level, the amended Stock Exchange Act mandates
self-regulation. Each regional stock exchange must establish a Trading
Supervision Authority (Exchange Authority) to supervise trading on the
exchange.' The Exchange Authorities must compile data on the trad-
ing activity in their respective exchanges in a systematic manner, assess
such data, and then conduct further investigations if necessary." 8
Self-regulation on the exchange level, nevertheless, falls completely
under the immediate supervision of the competent Regional Authority.
The Regional Authority may issue warnings to its subordinate Exchange
Authority and take over the exchange's internal investigations."° If an
Exchange Authority, on the basis of its investigations, ascertains facts
supporting the assumption of an exchange rule violation, it must imme-
diately notify the appropriate Regional Authority."'0 The standard for
criminal referral imposed on the Federal Supervisory Office, i.e., facts
confirming the suspicion,"'is much higher than the standard for inves-
tigative referral imposed on the Exchange Authorities, i.e., facts support-
ing the assumption.' As a result, more investigations are likely to be
funnelled from the exchanges to the regional level than from the federal
ness premises of specified exchange participants and the scope of such searches).
205. Id. § la(2) at 1761 (stating that the Regional Authority may implement reg-
ulations on the exchange and its participants in order to prevent violations of the
rules or to prevent other abuses that may jeopardize the orderly securities trade at the
exchange and the completion or surveillance of securities businesses).
206. Id.
207. Id. § lb at 1761 (creating the Trading Supervision Authority (Handeslilber-
wachungsstelle als B6rsenorgan), subject to the supervision of the competent Regional
Authority).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. § lb(5) at 1761 (providing for immediate referral of investigations from
Exchange to Regional Authority if latter authority determines that rules or regulations
have been violated that affect the orderly operation of securities trade).
211. See supra note 171 and accompanying text (describing standard for criminal
referral from Federal Supervisory Office to prosecutor's office under § 18(1)).
212. See supra notes 208, 210 and accompanying text (describing the standard for
investigatory referral from the Exchange to the Regional Authority under § lb(5)).
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level to criminal prosecution. The significance of this distinction is two-
fold: first, this differentiation signifies the large extent of control that
the Ldnder possess over the Regional Authorities; and second, this dis-
tinction demonstrates the extremely high burden of proof placed on
criminal referrals in Germany's new three-tiered securities enforcement
structure.
D. BARRmRS TO EFFECrvE ENFORCENMT
Initial reactions to the new Insider Trading Law range from positive
acceptance? to general uncertainty. 14 Because the new law repre-
sents a significant change from one financial culture to a disparate oth-
er,215 such a mixed response is certainly not unusual. The financial
community is concerned over potentially increased bureaucracy and
technocracy. 2 6 German financial specialists have also voiced trepida-
213. See Deutschland: Bankverband Unterstitt Finanzmarksgesetz [Germany: Bank-
ers Support the Financial Market Promotion Law], REutrER GERAN NEvs, June 23,
1994 [hereinafter Bankverband] (indicating that the Bankers Association welcomes the
Second Financial Markets Promotion Act since the Act will make the Finanzplatz
Deutschland more attractive and strengthen investor confidence).
214. See Templeman & Javetski, supra note 14, at 54 (noting that the "dramatic
cultural shift" called for by the new law will not occur "overnight," and quoting
Sabine Kruger of the Frankfurt-based financial publicist Charles Barker as stating that
the new law will cause a lot of initial confusion).
215. See Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Ja-
pan, and the United States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927, 1936-37 (1993) [hereinafter Some
Differences] (providing comparative analysis of German and American corporate cul-
ture and pointing out that a small group of institutional voting blocks at many Ger-
man companies control nearly half of the stock voted, while institutional control in
the United States does not exceed 5% blocks). For example, the Deutsche Bank holds
large aggregate voting blocks in the following German companies: (i) 17.64% in
Siemens, (ii) 41.80% in Daimler-Benz, (iii) 30.82% in Bayer, (iv) 28.07% in BASF,
(v) 14.79% in Hoechst, and (vi) 19.99% in VEBA. Id. Other illustrative examples of
the large amount of control German banks hold in German publicly-held corporations,
a phenomena that could not arise under United States banking regulations, are statis-
tics relating to the top five institutional voting blocks in Daimler-Benz: the Deutsche
Bank, Dresdner bank, Commerzbank, Sonst. Kredit, and the Bayerische L-Bank hold
41.80%, 18.78%, 12.24%, 4.41%, and 1.16%, respectively, or a cumulative total of
78.39%, in Daimler stock. Id; see also Germany Wakes Up to Equities, ECoNo.M ,
Oct. 1, 1994 [hereinafter Germany Wakes Up] (describing Germany's slow financial
revolution and noting that an equity culture is finally taking root in Germany).
216. See Dresdner's Eberstadt Says New Stock Exchange Lmvs May Increase Bu-
reaucracy, AFX NEWs, Dec. 30, 1994 [hereinafter Dresdner's Eberstadt] (expressing
the concerns of Dresdner Bank board member Gerhard Eberstadt over the new Insider
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tion over the evolution of a new class of overly-cautious equity advi-
sors217 and the development of a conservative information policy gen-
erally disadvantageous to stock traders."' While these problems and
fears are by no means insignificant, they nevertheless should be cate-
gorized as short-term problems that will gradually become less relevant
as German financial culture adapts to a new era of market transparency
and financial regulation.1 9
Aside from problems resulting directly from an initial period of ad-
justment to a new regulatory structure,"0 Germany's new insider
trading legislation has given rise to more substantial barriers to effective
enforcement and the eventual creation of a highly capitalized equity
market. These barriers may require legislative solutions. Problem areas
include possible statutory gaps in the definition of insider trading; con-
flicts between Frankfurt and the other regional exchanges due to
Frankfurt's new federal control over Germany's financial markets; and
the limited ability of non-commercial, domestic investors to invest in the
German equity market due to high banking and brokerage fees, and high
stock prices.
1. .Legislative Gaps: Definition of an Insider
Even though the Insider Trading Law offers a fairly expansive defini-
tion of insider trading,2" finance ministry officials have begun to ques-
tion the law's applicability to government insiders leaking economic data
Trading Law); Durch Umsetzung neuer Bdrsengesetze droht eine Zunahme an
Biirokratie. Dresdner-Bank-Vorstand Eberstadt: Firmen sollen mehr fir die eignen
Aktioniire tun [Passage of New Stock Exchange Laws Threaten an Increase in Bu-
reaucracy. Dresdner-Bank-Head Eberstadt: Companies Should Do More for Their Own
Shareholders], .SZ, Dec. 30, 1994 [hereinafter Bank-Vorstand Eberstadt] (providing full
text of interview).
217. See Dresdner's Eberstadt, supra note 216 (warning that "[i]f everyone has a
lawyer sitting behind them, no one will dare do anything").
218. See id. (stating that while company news was susceptible to varied interpreta-
tions in the past, in the future corporate news will focus on "a sober information
policy, largely based on earnings and performance figures"); see also Bank-Vorstand
Eberstadt, supra note 216 (adding that diversity of opinion generally helps trade in
securities).
219. See Dresdner's Eberstadt, supra note 216 (claiming that a long period of
uncertainty caused by the new law will "normalize only slowly").
220. See supra notes 213-19 and accompanying text (describing initial reactions to
the new Insider Trading Law).
221. See supra notes 117-24 and accompanying text (providing definitions of both
primary and secondary insiders under the Insider Trading Law).
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capable of influencing the financial markets.' While the Insider Trad-
ing Law expressly covers primary or secondary insiders trading on insid-
er information arising in the corporate context, it is not clear whether
the law extends to non-corporate parties possessing insider information,
such as macroeconomic data, that nevertheless, could affect entire in-
dustries or manufacturing sectors.m' This concern surfaced only recent-
ly as the German Ministry of Economics initiated an investigation into
leaks of sensitive ministry financial information on economic indicators
for industrial production to Frankfurt-based investors" '
2. High Cost of Regionalism
The passage of the Second Financial Markets Promotion Act has been
a lengthy and, at times, caustic state-federal battle over the creation of a
central supervisory body in a strong federal system'tm While Frankfurt
itself is not currently a powerful global financial center t and contin-
ues even today to suffer because of its limited role in world financial
markets,' Frankfurt has attained a financial stronghold in
222. See German Economics Ministry, AFX NEWS, Nov. 15, 1994 (noting that it
remains unclear whether government leaks of economic data are covered under the
new insider trading law).
223. Id; see supra note 128 and accompanying text (noting uncertainty in whether
insider information that arises in a non-corporate context, but nevertheless, is capable
of affecting securities markets and consequently securities prices, constitutes "insider
information" under § 13(1); and, arguing that such information should fall within the
law's coverage).
224. See Ministry Investigating Leaks to Market Speculators, AGENCE FRANCE
PREssE, Nov. 4, 1994 (discussing how millions of dollars can be made through leak-
ing sensitive financial information to stock exchange investors and noting that eco-
nomic ministry officials still have no solid evidence regarding the involvement of any
particular German government ministry).
225. Eisenhammer, supra note 13, at 12.
226. See Templeman & Javetski, supra note 14, at 54 (noting that the Frankfurt
exchange was a sideshow in 1980, with an annual turnover of just over S25 million);
see also supra notes 55, 80, 156 and accompanying text (providing additional infor-
mation concerning Frankfurt's status as an international financial center).
227. See Frankfurt Brushes Up, supra note 49, at 16 (noting that Frankfurt's self-
esteem recently took a beating when the Deutsche Bank decided to place its interna-
tional investment banking activities in London, home of the bank's UK merchant
banking subsidiary Morgan Grenfell, rather than in Frankfurt); see also Tony Roddam,
Dresdner Bid For Kleinwort is Blow to Frankfurt, REur'ER EUROPEAN Bus. REP.,
June 15, 1995 (noting that the recent decision of Dresdner Bank, Germany's second
largest bank, to buy British investment bank Kleinwort Benson constitutes "another
slap in the face of Frankfurt's ambitions to usurp London's financial supremacy" and
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Germany.' As a result, German legislators recognized that in order to
meet their goal of fostering the growth and international competitiveness
of the Finanzplatz Deutschland, Frankfurt was the logical place for ex-
pansion."' The growth of the Frankfurt exchange, however, has run up
against the strong tradition of competition between Germany's eight
regional exchanges." This battle for financial control among the ex-
changes, culminating in the fight over Frankfurt's rise to central control,
has had detrimental effects on Germany's financial industry as a
whole" and potentially may prove to be an impediment to the effec-
tive enforcement of Germany's new insider trading prohibition.
In October 1992, two years prior to the creation of the Frankfurt-
based Federal Supervisory Office, the development of the Finanzplatz
Frankfurt took a great leap forward with the creation of the Deutsche
B~rse AG. 2 The Deutsche B6rse AG is a Frankfurt-based holding
company that operates the Frankfurt exchange together with Germany's
other regional exchanges under a "single financial roof."" The Deut-
sche B6rse AG has been instrumental in the centralization of Germany's
financial markets by overcoming opposition to change from regional
exchanges such as Hamburg, Munich, and Stuttgart." The Deutsche
B~rs.e AG, due in part to its strong backing by Germany's largest banks,
has been successful in promoting greater centralization of Germany's
financial markets at the expense of regional exchanges, 5 which have
"a damning vote of no-confidence in Germany's banking capital-home of the
Bundesbank and future European central bank").
228. See supra notes 55, 80, 156 and accompanying text (providing information on
Frankfurt's status as a financial center).
229. See supra notes 55, 80, 156 and accompanying text (alluding to Frankfurt's
central role in making the Finanzplatz Deutschland more attractive to foreign inves-
tors).
230. World Equity Markets, supra note 80, at 11 (noting that Germany's financial
services industry has been fragmented because eight regional exchanges have tradition-
ally competed against each other in the German market).
231. Id. (noting that for years the structure of German capital markets has prevent-
ed the development of a central market and that the traditional competition between
Germany's eight regional exchanges has been deterimental to the industry as a whole).
232. Id.
233. See Whitney, supra note 57, at I (applauding the new structure for its effi-
ciency and technological sophistication. Recognizing critics' claims that banks have
created an exchange that only heavily capitalized players can afford to use. Further-
more, noting that smaller brokerage firms find telecommunications technology, elec-
tronic record-keeping, and transaction fees too costly).
234. Id.
235. See id. at 1 (noting that the Deutsche Bank's board member responsible for
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had much to gain from the expansion of the Frankfurt market." Only
a few years ago, the primary players on Germany's stock markets were
small private bankers and brokerage firms.' As activity on the Frank-
furt exchange increased and most of the lucrative players in the German
capital market moved to Frankfurt,' these smaller players were effec-
tively forced onto the sidelines. 9
The continued growth of Frankfurt as Germany's financial center has
caused the Linder and their respective exchanges to scramble for control
in the new securities enforcement structure and, as a result, has ignited
an entrenched debate about the future of Germany's eight regional ex-
changes.' If effective enforcement can only be achieved through
greater centralization, it appears inevitable that the battle between ex-
panding central control and traditional regional governance will not be
short-lived. Maintaining eight regional exchanges and their respective
regional supervisory authorities is a costly method of enforcing the
insider trading ban.24' Arguably, the high cost of maintaining
securities sales and trading, Rolf E. Breuer, is also the chairman of the Deutsche
B~rse AG). His position is indicative of the strong hold German banks have over the
Frankfurt exchange. Moreover, the composition of the supervisory council of the Deut-
sche B6rse AG, the policy-setting organ for the Frankfurt Exchange, illustrates the
essential role German banks play in directing the growth and development of
Germany's financial markets. Primarily, Germany's big banks dominate the decision-
making council of the Deutsche B6rse AG and only a minority of the council's mem-
bers represent the stock brokers and the regional exchanges. Weichenstellung der
Deutschen Bi'rse; Zentralisierung und Elektronisierung des Handels (The Position of
the Deutsche Bdrse; Centralization and Electronization of Trading], NZZ, May 26,
1995 (noting that shareholders of the Deutsche Btrse AG are the banks with 81%,
the stockbrokers (Makler) with 9% and a pool of the regional exchanges with 10%).
236. See Whitney supra note 57, at I (noting that banks have had much to gain
from expansion of the Frankfurt market).
237. See i. at 1 (stating that small banks and brokerage firms were active traders
on Germany's stock markets).
238. See id. at 1 (noting that Frankfurt is the home base for Germany's three big-
gest banks: the Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, and Commerzbank).
239. See id.
240. See Helga Einecke, Fdderung stat Fdrderalismus [Promotion Not Federal-
ism], SZ, Dec. 30, 1994 (discussing the embittered fight of Frankfurt's supremacy
over the other seven regional exchanges. In the interest of development rather than
federalism, Frankfurt should consider a mutually agreeable resolution).
241. See Finanzplatz Deutschland hat gewonnene Bdrsenreform aber noch nicht am
Ziel. Aufsichtsratsvorsitzender Breuer kritisiert teueres Regionalprinzip und
Zinsbesteuerung [The Financial Marketplace Germany Has Not Yet Accomplished
Successfid Stock Exchange Reform. Board of Directors Head Breuer Critcises Expen-
sive Concept of Regionalism and Taxation], SZ, Feb. 2, 1994 (summarizing the state-
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Germany's eight regional exchanges outweighs the benefits attainable
through the proposed complex and far-reaching structure.242 As com-
mentators have noted, the three-tiered enforcement structure is a victim
to federalism depending on the cost factor.243 As trading activity de-
creases on the smaller exchanges, the cost question comes more fre-
quently into play.2'
As the market in Germany begins to react to what investors view as
the potentially dwindling power-base of the regional exchanges, the cost
question becomes more acute. A large German chemical conglomerate,
BASF AG, only recently publicized its decision to de-list its shares from
all exchanges except the Frankfurt exchange.245 If successful,2" other
publicly-held, listed corporations likely will follow this move.247 Such
ments made by Rolf E. Breuer, head of the Deutsche B6rse AG, criticizing the ex-
pensive principle of regional supervision).
242. See Bankverband, supra note 213 (noting that a three-tiered surveillance struc-
ture is not an ideal solution in light of cost and efficiency factors).
243. See Bank-Vorstand Eberstadt, supra note 216 (stating that the ability of the
three-tiered enforcement structure to function properly is largely a question of cost. It
is likely that the centralized Frankfurt market may establish an electronic surveillance
function over other exchanges in the future).
244. See Einecke, supra note 240 (noting that the costs for electronic equipment
and personnel will be difficult for smaller exchanges with sinking trading volumes to
meet).
245. See Deutschland: BASF Spielt Bdrsenentscheidung Herunter [Germany: BASF
Plays Down Exchange Decision], REUTER GERMAN NEWS, Dec. 1, 1994 (discussing
BASF AG's decision and legal defenses); see also Frankfurt Brushes Up, supra note
49, at 16 (noting that BASF AG's decision was a surprise).
246. See Deutschland: Breuer Kritisiert Bdrsen Wegen BASF [Germany: Breuer
Criticises Exhanges Because of BASF], REUTER GERMAN NEWS, Mar. 16, 1995 (stat-
ing that the regional exchanges have refused to permit BASF AG to withdraw its
shares from listing on their exchanges and have threatened administrative court action
against BASF AG on this matter); see also id. (noting that Rolf E. Breuer, board
member of the Deutsche Bank and head of the Deutsche B6rse AG, criticized region-
al exhanges' lack of cooperation as follows: "If the clients do not show up at the
vegetable woman's stand at the weekly market, she goes home and not to court.").
Despite the threat of administrative action, the Deutsche BOrse AG's proposal to close
half of the regional exchanges, if legislatively implemented, does not appear to run
afoul of any legal prohibition or constitutional impediment. Towards a German Finan-
cial Center, supra note 49, at S112 (stating that under the Basic Law, the enactment
of legislation amending the Stock Exchange Act is fully within the domain of the
federal legislature, even though legislative procedure grants the Lnder an opportunity
to consult with the federal government in the legislative process).
247. See Frankfurt Brushes Up, supra note 49, at 16 (claiming that if the sale of
shares is successful it could encourage others to do the same).
[VOL. 11: 1
INSIDER TRADING IN GERMANY
actions will erode the ability of smaller exchanges to raise the capital
needed to implement the expansive supervisory mechanisms required
under the new law" and, in the end, may cause regional trading
structures to collapse.249
In late 1994, the Deutsche B6rse AG released a draft thesis as a
formal response to the growing concern over the cost effectiveness of
maintaining an operational, three-tiered enforcement structure throughout
the eight Ldnder and exchanges. '  The thesis recommended distribut-
ing control over specified areas of trading to the Frankfurt, Berlin,
Dusseldorf, and Munich exchanges and closing the remaining four ex-
changes in Stuttgart, Hannover, Hamburg, and Bremen.t Specifically,
the thesis envisioned that Frankfurt would take full control over the
trade in German standard stocks (Standardaktien), which primarily in-
clude DAX blue chip stocks; that Dfisseldorf would become the new
home for Germany's futures market; and that Munich and Berlin would
gain sole responsibility for the southern and northern German regional
securities markets respectively.'
The strong opposition to the proposed closure of half of Germany's
regional exchanges from both the regional exchanges and the .inder
governments' successfully impeded the implementation of the Deut-
248. See supra notes 239-44 and accompanying text (discussing problems resulting
from the high cost of regionalism for regional exchanges).
249. See Frankfurt Brushes Up, supra note 49, at 16 (speculating that other re-
gional exchanges soon may be serving advisory roles rather than a trading role).
250. See McKinsey pldidiert flir die Schliessung von vier deutschen RegionalbUrsen.
Konzentration auf restliche Handelspliitze angeregtlStrategiethesen sorgen fir Wirbel
[McKinsey opts for the closing of four German regional exchanges. Concentration on
Remaining Trading Places RecommendedlStrategy Thesis Causes Commotion], SZ,
Nov. 12, 1994 [hereinafter McKinsey] (discussing strategy thesis and the respective
realms of competence it proposes to create); Harsche Kritik an Bdrsenthesen. Bremen
Beftirchtet Schliessung Aller Regionalen Handelspldtze [Harsh Criticism of Exchange
Thesis. Bremen Fears Closure of All Regional Exchanges), SZ, Nov. 15, 1994 [here-
inafter Harsche Kritik] (discussing the negative reaction of regional exchanges towards
the thesis proposal).
251. Harsche Kritik, supra note 250.
252. McKinsey, supra note 250.
253. Harsche Kritik, supra note 250. Opponents of the thesis raised two basic
arguments. First, they argued that the financial markets in Berlin, Dasseldorf, and
Munich would receive an enormous advantage to the detriment of the markets in
Stuttgart, Hannover, Hamburg, and Bremen. See supra notes 249-52 and accompanying
text (describing proposal to allocate specialized functions to select regional exchanges
and close remaining exchanges). Second, opponents feared that the proposal to close
the specified exchanges would result primarily from political pressures, rather than
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sche B6rse AG's strategy thesisY 4 Nevertheless, it forced the strongest
of Germany's regional exchanges to take matters into their own hands.
In May 1995, the exchanges of Frankfurt, Munich, and Dtisseldorf en-
tered into an agreement for far-reaching cooperation in the securities
trade with the intent of strengthening the liquidity and efficiency of the
German securities market. 5 Even though the agreement does not re-
quire the merger of the three exchanges into a single entity, the agree-
ment calls for extensive cooperation in the trading of DAX stocks and
allows for greater development of the regional securities market's pricing
policies by the regional exchanges. 6 While some of the remaining ex-
changes are considering entering a cooperation agreement amongst them-
impartial financial analyses focusing, for example, on the exchanges' respective trading
volume. See McKinsey, supra note 250 (citing Wolfgang Peterhoff, the head of the
D0sseldorf exchange, as stating that he would not oppose economically rational inno-
vations, but that it was not clear whether the plans for restructuring German financial
markets were truly economical); see also Harsche Kritik, supra note 250 (charging
Deutsche Brrse AG of trying to manipulate securities trading in Frankfurt in order to
transfer all trading to an electronic trading system); cf. Blum, supra note 18, at 507
n.3 (noting that Hamburg is the third most important regional exchange in Germany
and basing this conclusion on data of turnover in domestic shares and percentage
share of domestic bonds, foreign shares, and foreign fixed-interest securities markets).
254. See Die Borsen in Frankfurt, Diisseldorf und Miinchen planen eine enge
Kooperation. Absichtserkldrung unterzeichnetlEinheitliche Preisfindung bei DAX-Werten
vorgesehen [The Exchanges in Frankfurt, Diisseldorj, and Munich Plan a Close Coop-
eration. Agreement of Intent is Signed/Conformity in Setting DAX Prices Intended],
SZ, May 9, 1995 [hereinafter Kooperation] (noting that the competent Ministers for
the Ldnder ruled against the non-market determined closure of the four regional ex-
changes since such closure would cause the number of market participants and the
liquidity of the market as a whole to diminish).
255. Id.
256. Id. While sources have noted that the agreement mandates the implementation
of a common exchange surveillance and admissions authority, id., the creation of such
common bodies apparently requires prior legislative approval. See Bernhard Wild,
Kurse der Regionalbirsen sinken. Die Zukunft der kleinen Finanzpldtze ist ungewisser
denn je [Trading on the Regional Exchanges is Decreasing. The Future of the Small
Financial Marketplaces is More Uncertain than Ever], SZ, May 13, 1995 (noting that
such legislative approval may take the form of a third Financial Markets Promotion
Act).
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selves, they appear to have missed the only train for ensured surviv-
Overall, Germany's current regional exchange structure poses a serious
impediment for the successful implementation of the insider trading
prohibition and the general policy behind the Second Financial Markets
Promotion Act." 9 Both federal and state authorities in Germany have
recognized the importance of ensuring continued international competi-
tiveness of Germany's securities markets and thus, have forged a new
path for greater centralization of Germany's exchanges.' While adher-
ence to traditional, albeit antiquated, concepts of federalism are difficult
to overcome for some German LdnderssI greater centralization of
257. See, e.g., Kleine Birsen suchen nach Gemeinsamkeiten [Small Exchanges
Search for Similarities], SZ, May 16, 1995 (citing comments of the Pie.ident of the
Hannover Exchange, Dirk Hoffman, on intended discussion among smaller exchanges
to explore possibility for cooperation); Deutschland: Hamburger Bdrse zu
Kooperationen bereit [Germany: Hamburg Exchange Is Willing to Cooperate], RETER
GERMAN NEws, May 16, 1995 (noting willingness of Hamburg exchange to enter into
a cooperation agreement with other exchanges, as long as such cooperation does not
include a merger with other exchanges); Deutschland: Bremer B~rse Weiter Gegen
Frankfurt Btrsenplan [Germany: Bremen Exchange Continues to Oppose the Frankfurt
Exchange Strategy], REUTER GERmAN NEws, May 22, 1995 (supporting mutual coop-
eration, but not fusion); Bdrse Berlin bedingt kooperationswillig [Berlin Exchange is
Conditionally Willing to Cooperate], SZ, May 10, 1995 [hereinafter Btrse Berlin]
(noting willingness of Berlin Exchange to join cooperation agreement between Frank-
furt, Ddsseldorf, and Munich and stating that Stuttgart Exchange hopes to stay inde-
pendent).
258. See Wild, supra note 256 (citing the Director of the Munich Exchange,
Heinz W. Schmitt, as stating that "the train goes on towards Frankfurt and cannot be
delayed any longer," and noting that Schmitt obviously decided to go right along with
that train); see also Bdrse Berlin, supra 257 (noting that Frankfurt has rejected
Berlin's offer to join the cooperation agreement with Frankfurt, Dusseldorf, and Mu-
nich).
259. See supra notes 225-58 and accompanying text (discussing the problems that
Germany's regional and decentralized exchange structure pose for the successful en-
forcement of the insider trading prohibition and the effective promotion of Germany's
financial markets to foreign and domestic investors).
260. See supra notes 232-58 and accompanying text (discussing initiatives to en-
courage greater centralization of Germany's financial markets, including the creation of
the Deutsche B6rse AG, the Deutsche B6rse AG's strategy thesis, and the cooperation
agreement between Frankfurt, Munich, and Ddsseldorf).
261. Cf. Martini plfdiert fur drei Birsenplitze [Martini Argues for Three Exchang-
es], SZ, July 10, 1995 (citing Eberhard Martini of the Bayerischen Hypotheken- und
Wechsel-Bank AG in Munich as stating that the current decentralized system of eight
regional exchanges is an "anachronism" which foreign countries simply would not
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Germany's financial markets will prove essential in ensuring effective
and standardized enforcement of Germany's insider trading prohibition
and, thus, in promoting the international competitiveness of the
Finanzplatz Deutschland.
3. Market for Highly Capitalized Players
A third barrier to meeting the underlying goal of the insider trading
prohibition of expanding the Finanzplatz Deutschland through the attrac-
tion of greater equity investment in German capital markets is rooted in
the reality thae62 the German financial market remains a market for
highly capitalized players. The banking and brokerage fees, as well as
the prices of stocks listed on the German exchanges, remain too high to
attract needed equity capital. These two areas will be considered in turn.
a. Banking and Brokerage Fees
While German legislators, in order to attract greater equity investment,
have abolished elements of a previously disadvantageous tax
structure, 3 the fees imposed on investors in the German stock market
remain exorbitant. ' Banks and brokers alike charge heavily for equity
custody services through variable bank and high broker commissions,
respectively.' While the new law does not create any incentives for
understand).
262. See supra notes 44, 46-58 and accompanying text (describing measures taken
to improve the Finanzplatz Deutschland).
263. See Blum, supra note 18, at 509 (listing taxes on the purchase and sale of
stock as one reason why German markets failed to attract small German investors);
see also World Equity Markets, supra note 80, at 11 (noting that the German ex-
change tax was abolished at the end of 1990).
264. See, e.g., Blum, supra note 18, at 509 (showing relatively high, fixed broker
commissions as another reason why small German investors have no incentive to
invest in equity securities); World Equity Markets, supra note 80, at 11 (noting that
investors in Germany are liable to brokers for a commission of 0.06% and to bankers
for a variable commission covering "liquidation, settlement, investment advice and
analysis" which is "linked to the size of the transaction"); Equity, supra note 46, at
82 (explaining that by charging heavily for equity custody services, banks reduce the
value of dividend income to smaller investors and, in turn, effectively discourage in-
vestors from buying shares).
265. See supra note 264 (discussing high bank and broker fees); see also Frank
Eisner, Immer mehr Firmen locken Kleinanleger mit Fiinf-Markt-Aktien. Doch hohe
Bankgebiihren schrecken die Sparer ab [Ever More Firms Attract Small Investors with
Five-Mark-Stocks, High Banking Fees, However, Scare Investors Away], DIE WOCHE,
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lowering such equity investment fees,' a few banks, on their own ini-
tiative, opened discount brokerage houses to make lower cost investment
services available to smaller, non-institutional investors.'h 7 Nevertheless,
despite such limited, market-driven attempts at lowering the market entry
costs for smaller investors, the banks have not been overly active in
promoting their discount houses. In addition, it does not appear that
such houses will provide smaller investors with the degree of investment
advice and guidance otherwise available through traditional investment
services.
Furthermore, it is likely that the exchanges will suffer considerably
higher operation costs in the next few years as a result of the gradual
transition from a floor to an electronic trading system 9 and the cre-
ation of an expensive exchange surveillance structure as mandated by
the new law? 0 The exchanges, in turn, will not be interested in charg-
May 5, 1995, at 14 (noting that the high fees, usually not below DM 50, charged by
German banks both at the time of purchase and sale of stocks represents the largest
barrier against investment in German securities for small investors and further noting
that even "dream dividends" will not overcome such investment costs).
266. See FmFG, supra note 2, at 1749-85 (failing to provide mandatory or discre-
tionary incentives to lower such fees).
267. See Eisner, supra note 265, at 14 (noting that numerous financial institutions
have established subsidiaries specializing in the securities trade, called "Discount Bro-
kers," which do not offer personal consultations and, thus, are able to provide servic-
es at half the usual cost. Furthermore, pursuant to a study by the foundation
Warentest, such discount brokerage services are only advantageous to individuals in-
vesting over DM 5000 and engaging in active trading).
268. See supra note 267 (noting that discount houses do not offer personal con-
sultations).
269. See Computerbdrsen, supra note 80 (discussing the Deutsche B6rse AG's new
proposal, officially announced on May 30, 1995, under the project name "ZEUS," to
implement a complete electronic trading system in Germany in the next three to five
years and gradually phase out floor trading- noting that computerized auctions will
soon determine the course of the most heavily traded securities while broker-dealers
will retain control over the less popular securities; and, finally, commenting that the
new electronic trading system will be enormously expensive). W/hile the modernization
of Germany's exchange trading system is essential in ensuring greater competitiveness
of Germany's securities markets with the United States and Japan, technological im-
provements will undoubtedly raise the cost of investment in German securities. See
Politische Skepsis gegenjiber dem "Zeus" Project [Political Skepticism About "Zues"
Project], NZZ, July 7, 1995, at 31 [hereinafter Politische Skepsis] (discussing impact
of electronic trading system on Germany's international competitiveness).
270. See supra notes 199-206 and accompanying text (describing regional surveil-
lance structure); see also supra notes 207-10 and accompanying text (describing ex-
change surveillance structure).
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ing its participants, brokers and credit institutes, lower fees. These play-
ers, as a result, will pass their higher costs, particularly those incurred in
funding the Federal Supervisory Office and its subordinate surveillance
structures, on to the investor." As it becomes more difficult for
smaller investors to meet these investment-related expenses, they likely
will choose not to invest in German equity securities.
b. Stock Prices
The prices of stocks listed on the German exchanges are much higher
than those of its foreign counterparts and have traditionally dissuaded
the non-institutional investor from entering the German equity mar-
ket.2" The Second Financial Markets Promotion Act recognizes the
problem that expensive stocks pose for the successful allure of equity
capital and has initiated the useful reform of lowering the mandatory par
value of German shares from DM 50 to DM 5. 3 Overall, legislators
hope this reform will encourage more people to buy shares on the Ger-
man stock market. 4
While the reform of the German share price structure calls only for
voluntary compliance, several of Germany's largest public corpora-
tions27 and financial institutions, including Germany's third largest
271. See supra note 152 (discussing distribution of funding for the Federal Super-
visory Office).
272. See, e.g., World Equity Markets, supra note 80, at 11 (stating that the current
value of German equity shares is too expensive for the average German non-institu-
tional investor); Equity, supra note 46, at 82 (reporting that only 6% or 7% of the
households in Germany own shares as compared to 20% in the UK and 30% in the
United States); Survey of Germany, supra note 50, at V ("[The market capitalization
of German shares is equivalent to some 30 per cent of GNP, again far lower than
elsewhere.").
273. FmFG, supra note 2, art. 16 at 1783-84 (Changing the Exchange Listing Re-
quirements); see Equity, supra note 46, at 82 (stating that lowering the nominal value
of German shares is a useful reform since high nominal values have prevented inves-
tors from buying diversified portfolios).
274. Gallagher, supra note 124.
275. See, e.g., Fielmann liebdugelt verstdrkt mit dem Ausland. Bdrsengang
verschaft Europas grfiten Optiker Kapital fir weitere Expansion [Fielman Flirts More
Strongly With Foreign Countries. The Course of Trading Brings to Europe's Largest
Optician Capital for Further Expansion], SZ, Sept. 6, 1994 (noting that Fielmann AG,
Europe's biggest optician, is the first German company to issue preferred stock at a
list price of 5 DM); Eisner, supra note 265, at 14 (reporting that numerous German
companies, including Escom, Metallgesellschaft, and Schering, are following the lead
of Fielmann in offering so-called baby stocks. In addition, commentating that
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bank, Dresdner Bank, 6 have already begun to issue stock at a list
price of DM 5, or plan to do so in the near futurem Nevertheless, the
Deutsche Bank and the Commerzbank are currently refusing to follow in
the footsteps of the Dresdner Bank and introduce a so-called "baby
stock." Moreover, critics remain skeptical about the ability of the
DM 5 stocks to cause an increase in the investment of stock certificates
because dividing a share into smaller units only means higher adminis-
trative costs.' In part to address higher administrative costs and to
maintain the traditional investment climate in Germany, German banks
have countered the lower stock prices by only selling such securities in
Fielmann stocks have been extremely active over the last eight months due to
Fielmann's decision to offer securities at a DM 5 par value, or DM 44.50 per share,
as compared to an otherwise DM 445 value per share for a DM 50 par value);
Daimler profitiert vom China-Project. Favorit KHD I Bankaktien leichter I
Schleppender Rentenhandel [Daimler Profits from China Project. Favorite KHDIBank
Stocks are LighterlSlow Annuity Trade], SZ, July 13, 1995 (announcing that the com-
pany KHD is profiting from adopting a DM 5 par value for its stocks by incurring a
7.7% increase in trading activity); Veba stellt auf Filnf-DM-Aktien urn [Veba Adopts
Five-DM-Stocks], SZ, July 17, 1995 (indicating that Veba AG adopted a par value of
DM 5 in order to attract smaller investors).
276. Deutschland: Dresdner Bank fiihrt 5-DM-Aktie ein [Germany: Dresdner Bank
Introduces 5-DM-Stock], REtrrER GERmAN NEWS, Dec. 6, 1994; Dresdner Bank locla
mit 5-DM-Aktie [Dresdner Bank Tempts Investors with 5-DM-Stock), SZ, Dec. 7,
1994; see Eisner, supra note 265, at 14 (noting that the Bayerisehe Vereinsbank and
Allianz-Versicherung have also decided to offer stocks at the lower DM 5 par value).
277. See, e.g., Daimler Greets Approval of Five Mark Share, REuTER ECoN.
NEws, July 8, 1994 (stating that Dainier will issue five mark shares "as soon as
possible" and noting that one 50 DM Daimler shares currently costs about 725 DM);
Ashley Seager, Daimler Welcomes New Lav on Five Aark Shares, REurER EuRoPE-
AN Bus. REP., July 8, 1994 (noting that at the next annual shareholder meeting in
May 1995, Daimler will seek the approval of its shareholders for a "10-for-one share
split"); Germany Wakes Up, supra note 215 (describing that in the privatization of
Deutsche Telekom, Germany's telecommunications monopoly, Telekom will issue
"people's share[s]" at 5-DM-shares to reach the ordinary German investors).
278. See Deutschland: Deutsche Bank Wartet Alit Fiinf-DM-Aksie Ab [Germany:
Deutsche Bank Holds Off on 5-DM-StockJ, REumT, GERr, Nmvs, Dec. 7, 1994
(referring to Deutsche bank's reluctance to follow lead of Dresdner Bank); see also
Commerzbank mischt im Poker urn Holzmann Mist. Alles ist eine Frage des Preises I
Kohlhaussen dufiert sich skeptisch zu 5-DM-Aktien [Commerzbank Makes Smoke for
Holzmann. Everything is a Question of the Price. Kohlhaussen Makes Sceptical Re-
marks About 5-DM-Stock], SZ, Sept. 21, 1994 [hereinafter Kohlhaussen] (noting skep-
ticism of Commerzbank to issue a 5-DM-stock).
279. Kohlhaussen, supra note 278.
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big bundles or by calculating transaction fees to the disadvantage of
purchasers of less-weighty stocks.28
In the end, the opening up of the German stock market to smaller,
non-institutional investors depends primarily on the actions of the Ger-
man banking community.28 ' German banks, to a large extent, control
the public corporations listed on the exchanges282 and, thus, have con-
siderable influence on the stock pricing policies of such corporations.283
The banking world in Germany has much at stake in the regulation of
German financial markets and hopefully will enact reforms liberalizing
their conservative investing policies to date, if not on their own initia-
tive, then as a result of mounting public and political pressures.284
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
Relying on the previous discussion of barriers to the effective imple-
mentation of Germany's new insider trading legislation, this Comment
proposes several recommendations for ensuring effective enforcement of
the Insider Trading Law and successful implementation of the primary
motivation behind its prohibitions, namely the promotion of the
Finanzplatz Deutschland both in the domestic and international realm.
280. See Elsner, supra note 265, at 14 (stating that the banks are creating new
barriers to "keep small investors away" by only offering newly-issued DM 5 par
value stocks in bundles and by calculating their banking transaction fees according to
the number of stocks sold not, as previously determined, according to a percentage of
the total value of the stocks sold).
281. See Bankgebiihren bedrohen leichte Aktie. Kleinaktiondre ziehen eine
erniichternde Dividenden-Bilanz [Bank Fees Threaten Eight Stocks. Small Stockholders
Carry a Sobering Divident Balance], SZ, Aug. 9, 1994 (noting that a trade associa-
tion for small stockholders welcomes the new price reform, but does not trust German
banks since they are likely to raise banking fees proportionally to the increase in
stock splits. This would result in the creation of smaller nominal shares from larger
shares). But see Bank-Vorstand Eberstadt, supra note 216 (arguing that the criticism
directed against banks for only issuing shares in big blocks was unfair because the
banks should not have to carry all of the costs).
282. See Some Differences, supra note 215, at 1955 (describing the powerful role
German banks play in running German public corporations and noting that German
banks substantially control the German securities market).
283. See Guidelines, supra note 23, at S70 (describing how a German bank par-
ticipating in the issuance of equity traditionally "[w]ill take care of the price develop-
ment of a security on the stock exchange" under the premise of "Kurspflege").
284. See Mark J. Roe, German "Populism" and the Large Public Corporation, 14
INT'L RaV. L. & ECON. 187 (1994) (describing the effect of political pressure on
German banks).
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A. CENTRALIZATION OF GERMANY'S REGIONAL EXCHANGE STRUCTURE
First, German legislators should take steps to minimize the high cost
of regionalism arising from the currently-envisioned, three-tiered securi-
ties enforcement structure.' Specifically, the federal legislature should
give great weight to the Deutsche B6rse AG's proposal to close
Germany's smaller regional exchanges. As the new agreement between
the exchanges of Frankfurt, Dusseldorf, and Munich illustrates, the mar-
ket clearly needs some measure of greater cooperation among the Ger-
man exchanges. This could result in the more efficient operation of the
exchange structure as a whole, possibly culminating in the merger of the
Frankfurt, Munich, and Dusseldorf Exchange and the closure of
Germany's remaining six regional exchanges.
Despite the cost and efficiency benefits of creating only one central-
ized trading center in Frankfurt, it would be disadvantageous for Germa-
ny to take all regional exchanges out of the securities playing field
entirely. Maintaining the operation of a few of the strongest regional
exchanges in Germany will help foster competition among the German
financial markets and, thereby, help improve the Finanzplatz
Deutschland's ability to compete internationally.' The regional ex-
changes also serve a useful role in providing market access to smaller
and medium-sized companies in Germany, who would suffer if they
were forced to enter Frankfurt's more competitive financial environ-
ment.' In addition, Germany's smaller regional exchanges may be
better qualified, than the Frankfurt exchange, to provide specialized, cus-
tomer-oriented services, particularly attractive to smaller, non-institutional
investors. For example, they could extend their hours of operation, with-
285. See supra notes 224-61 and accompanying text (discussing the cost-benefits of
restructuring Germany's decentralized exchange structure).
286. See Deutschland: LZB-Chef Krupp Gegen Birsen-Konzentration [Germany:
LZB-Head Krupp Opposes Concentration of Exchanges], REUTER GERMAN NEWs,
Jan. 11, 1995 (arguing that limiting the stock trade to Frankfurt alone would restrict
competitiveness within Germany and would jeopardize Germany's ability to compete
internationally); see also Fischer will Regionalbdrsen erhalten. Niedersachsens Minister
kritisiert Thesenpapier [Fischer Wants to Maintain Regional Exchanges. Nidersachsen
Minister Criticises Thesis Paper], SZ, Jan. 14, 1995 [hereinafter Regionalb~rsen] (stat-
ing that the concentration of the securities business in one city would limit the num-
ber of participants and be detrimental for the entire Fmanzplatz Deutschland).
287. See Regionalbrsen, supra note 286 (fearing that smaller companies would go
under in the Finanzplatz Frankfurt because no one would pay any attention to them
on the larger exchanges).
1996] 189
AM. U. J. INTL L. & POL'Y
in the limitations of the German business law, and provide more per-
sonalized services.2
Nevertheless, it is inevitable that the Finanzplatz Deutschland will
suffer, with respect to its international competitiveness, if all seven
regional exchanges, aside from Frankfurt, remain operative for much
longer. Although market forces probably will bring about the closure of
Germany's smaller regional exchanges in the next few years, the earlier
German authorities create a workable and efficient securities exchange
structure, the sooner they will be successful in their attempts to optimize
the competitiveness of the Finanzplatz Deutschland.
B. MODERNIZATION OF GERMANY'S EXCHANGE TRADING SYSTEM
Second, federal and state German legislators should recognize that the
Deutsche BSrse AG is encouraging the development of an innovative
and sophisticated electronic trading system in Germany. 89 A state-of-
the-art electronic trading system in Germany is essential for insider
trading enforcement efforts by providing more precise record-keeping of
securities trading and greater market transparency.'l Such a system
will also ensure Germany's position as a European financial center. In
addition, it will help Germany establish a special niche in its struggle
for global recognition in the international investing community.'
288. See Deutschland: Regionalbirsen Erwiigen Liingere Handelszeiten [Germany:
Regional Exchanges Consider Longer Trading Times], REUTER GERMAN NEWS,
Feb. 6, 1995 (noting that the regional exchanges are considering extending their hours
of operation); see also Deutsche Borsen auf der Suche nach neuen Wegen;
Entdriickende Vorherrschaft Frankfurts [German Exchanges in Search of New Ways;
Frankfurt's Envious Lead], NZZ, Jan. 17, 1995 (recognizing that regional exchanges
must look for specialized tasks in order to survive. For example, the Hamburg ex-
change is interested in attracting small companies to their exchange that previously
had difficulty gaining access).
289. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (describing the IBIS trading system
and proposals to expand this system into a computerized auction exchange).
290. See Netzer, supra note 52 (noting that while tips, not irregularities in trading
data, primarily led to the discovery of most insider trading cases in the past, tips will
become less important "as more trades become visible through on-line trading"); see
also Abstimmung iiber das Zeus-Project. Deutsche Bdrse vor entscheidender
Weichenstellung [Consensus on the Zeus-Project. German Exchange Faces Decisive
Turning Point], SZ, May 23, 1995 (noting that the ZEUS project will allow the pub-
lic listing of all orders for the purchase and sale of securities (offenes Auftragsbuch),
thereby contributing to greater market transparency).
291. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text (describing the importance of a
state-of-the-art electronic trading system for competing internationally).
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C. PROVISION OF MARKET ACCESS FOR NON-INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
AND SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED GERMAN FIRMS
While a more centralized exchange structure and an electronic trading
system will help attract a greater number of institutional investors to
Germany's capital markets and promote the international competitiveness
of the Finanzplatz Deutschland, such innovations will be costly. German
legislators must take steps to prevent the costs incurred in improving the
financial investment structure in Germany from jeopardizing the ability
of non-institutional investors from investing in Germany's securities
markets, and smaller and mid-sized German companies from obtaining
equity financing. German authorities may be able to decrease the finan-
cial burden of investing in German equity markets by enabling greater
competition among the providers of investment services or by financing
some of the costs for improving the Finanzplatz Deutschland with feder-
al funds.
D. CREATION OF CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE RFMEDIES
With respect to the effective enforcement of the Insider Trading Law,
German legislators should recognize the limitations inherent in enabling
only criminal prosecution of insider trading violations and enact mea-
sures allowing for both administrative and civil actions, Establishing
a wider variety of judicial measures for combatting insider trading will
ensure, first, that fewer insider traders are able to avoid detection and
punishment,293 and second, that the limited enforcement resources of
the Federal Supervisory Office are put to their best use ' In many
292. See Kein Papiertiger, supra note 69 (stating that the Insider Trading Law's
provisions are not accessible to private parties seeking compensation for damages. The
law was issued for the purpose of improving Germany's capital markets not for the
purpose of creating private rights of action).
293. See Dealing, supra note 72 (noting that Britain's tough criminal prohibitions
on insider trading are less effective than the American approach, which are mostly
civil cases that encourage insider defendants to settle without going to trial and crimi-
nal prosecutions are left for the serious cases); Insider am Geldbeutel treffen [Hit
Insiders at Their Wallets], SZ, Aug. 9, 1994 (finding that Americans solved problems
involved in criminally prosecuting insider traders by requiring persons to disgorge
illegally gained profits prior to imposing criminal liability).
294. Compare FLHrCHER, supra note 11, at 6 n.22, 25 (noting that the SEC's fis-
cal 1989 budget was $142.6 million, of which $45 million were allocated to enforce-
ment and that the Enforcement Division has a staff of 650 lawyers) with supra note
157 (noting that the Federal Supervisory Office has a current budget of S7.6 million
1996]
AM. U. J. INTL L. & POL'Y
other countries, like the United States, criminal prosecution of insider
trading violations supplements an expansive civil and administrative
enforcement scheme meant to catch the so-called big fish.295 Further-
more, in criminal actions the burden of proof is generally higher than
that for civil or administrative actions and the scope of available reme-
dies is limited.2"
E. PURSUIT OF STRONG AND SUCCESSFUL CASES EARLY ON
Finally, the new class of federal securities enforcement officials need
some early convictions of individuals who violate the new Insider Trad-
ing Law. While attempts to prevent insider trading violations from oc-
curring in the first place, through such requirements as ad hoc publici-
ty,297 are important, quick and effective enforcement efforts are essen-
tial to show the world-at-large that Germany is taking its new role in
global securities regulation seriously.298
CONCLUSION
German legislators have made great strides toward improving the
Finanzplatz Deutschland by enacting the Second Financial Markets Pro-
motion Act with the Insider Trading Law as its centerpiece. Overall, the
law provides for a comprehensive insider trading prohibition and an
expansive three-tiered enforcement structure. The law grants the new
Federal Supervisory Office a wide realm of enforcement authority pre-
and expects to hire a staff of 97).
295. See FLETCHER, supra note 11, at 525 (describing areas of enforcement under
United States securities laws, such as administrative and criminal sanctions and insti-
tutional liability).
296. Langevoort, supra note 147 (noting (i) that the burden of proof under
criminal securities laws is only circumstantial which makes conviction extraordinarily
difficult; and (ii) that the United States statutory basis for insider trading enforcement
combines criminal penalties, civil injunctions, disgorgement and civil penalties, while
other countries rely much more on simple criminal enforcement).
297. See supra notes 173-83 and accompanying text (describing ad hoc publicity
requirement).
298. See Erster Insiderfall beim Staatsanwalt [The First Insider Trading Case at
the Prosecutor's Office], SZ, July 8, 1995 (reporting that as of July 1995, the Federal
Supervisory Office has initiated investigations into 10 cases of alleged insider trading,
half of which still remain open and one of which has been referred to the State
Attorney's Office for Prosecution).
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mised on a combination of far-reaching mandatory disclosure and com-
prehensive, continuous surveillance.
The strengths of the Insider Trading Law clearly lie in the daunting
scope of its prohibitions and criminal sanctions and the arduous duties it
places on all market participants. Coming from a culture of selectively-
disseminated insider information and practically limitless opportunities
for undetected insider trading, there surely will be a period of initial
confusion and opposition among market participants. These sentiments
likely will pass, but more substantial barriers will remain unless properly
dealt with.
The primary weaknesses of the new law derive not from the law
itself, but from the forces of change it has set in motion. By creating a
central federal enforcement agency in a highly federalized structure, the
law has effectively depleted the power base of the states and given free
reign to a centralized market structure. By imposing the costs for the
new agency on the financial community and other market participants,
the law has substantially raised the costs for investor participation in
Germany's equity markets. In sum, the law has created a market place
for highly capitalized players.
The creation of a market for highly capitalized players runs afoul of
the primary purpose of the Second Financial Markets Promotion Act.
Legislators implemented the Act in order to open up Germany's capital
markets to multiple domestic and foreign investors and to attract much
needed equity capital. While the Finanzplatz Deutschland, or Finanzplatz
Frankfurt as it is now being called, may not turn out to be truly open to
unsophisticated investors and small issuers, Germany's new Insider Trad-
ing Law, nevertheless, is sufficiently comprehensive to raise investor
confidence in German securities markets and attract many new, albeit
wealthy, investors.
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